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I.

INTRODUCTION

The owners of cash value life insurance and annuity contracts
have long been able to defer paying tax on the income accruing inside
these products - that is, on the "inside buildup."1 Early insurance

products provided their contract owners with only a low, guaranteed
return close to the risk-free rate of return. 2 Concerns about the effect

of inflation on these products, however, triggered the creation in 1952
of a new insurance product: an annuity tied to investments yielding a

variable, risk-related return.3 It took some time for the variable
annuity to gain acceptance, perhaps because of uncertainty
surrounding its classification for securities and tax law purposes.4 In

1959, the Supreme Court provided some resolution of the securities
law questions, and shortly thereafter Congress signaled its decision to
allow the inside buildup of variable annuities to accumulate on a taxdeferred basis.5
1 Although this treatment of inside buildup is well established,
as Professor

Pike has observed with respect to life insurance, "[t]he precise statutory basis for this
exclusion is obscure." Andrew D. Pike, Reflections on the Meaning of Life: An
Analysis of Section 7702 and the Taxation of Cash Value Life Insurance, 43 TAx L.
REV. 491, 493 n.2 (1988). With respect to annuities, deferral is implied by section
72(e), which governs the taxation of annuity withdrawals. See infra notes 186-88 and
accompanying text; see also Richard W. Skillman, The Impact of TEFRA and the 1984
Act on the "Inside Build-up" Under Life Insurance Products,43 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 40-1, 40-30 (1985) (describing the similarly obscure origin for the deferral
applying to annuities).
2 See infra notes 23, 42 and accompanying
text.
3 See infra notes 23-25 and accompanying
text.
4 For a discussion of evidence that tax law uncertainty
inhibits the marketing of
new types of securities, see Mark P. Gergen & Paula Schmitz, The Influence of Tax
Law on Securities Innovation in the United States: 1981-1997, 52 TAX L. REV. 119, 15762 (1997). In the case of variable insurance, both securities and tax law uncertainties
were present during the first years of the product.
5 See infra notes 29-36 and accompanying
text.
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Beginning around 1965, taxpayers began to exploit the
inconsistency arising from the difference between the treatment of
variable insurance returns and the economically similar returns
available outside variable insurance. 67 In the tax avoidance game' that
has developed, variable contract purveyors wrap a variety of incomeproducing investments inside variable annuities or life insurance in
order to defer paying tax on the inside buildup. The contract
marketers also try to minimize insurance features of the contracts
(e.g., the mortality bet) to maximize the contract holder's control over
the income-producing assets underlying the contract, and to provide
contract holders with access to the inside buildup without triggering
6

See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah

H. Schenk,

Taxation Without

Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 751
(1992) (discussing the complexity arising from the failure to treat economically similar
transactions identically); David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative
Securities: An Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1895 (2004) (discussing
consistency).
Because life insurance companies have also received numerous tax benefits,
there has generally been no offsetting detriment, and so no symmetry of treatment for
the parties to the variable insurance. See Howard Stecker et al., Separate Account
Products, Part II: Tax Rules Along the Insurance Product Continuum, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Aug. 5, 1998) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 98 TNT 150-29)
(describing how separate account investment income is generally excluded from
insurance company taxable income); see also Alvin C. Warren, Jr., FinancialContract
Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV. 460, 471 (1993) ("Electivity of
tax treatment might be tolerable... if a tax-advantaged choice for one taxpayer were
always coupled with a tax-disadvantaged consequence for another taxpayer.").
7 George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters:
Taking a
Lesson From History, 54 SMU L. REV. 209, 216-17 (2001) (using the phrase "Tax
Avoidance game" to describe the efforts of taxpayers to outmaneuver changes in the
law); see also David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing
Aggressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1344 (2000) (using the term
"planning option" to describe how well-advised taxpayers restructure transactions for
favorable tax treatment).
This article uses the traditional distinction between tax avoidance and tax
evasion. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE
TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 171 (3d ed. 2004). This distinction has been expressed
by the aphorism: "The poor evade, and the rich avoid ... " Id. at 179. That is, the
poor, unable to afford high-priced help, enter into transactions that are more clearly
fraudulent, fail to report income, and/or overstate deductions or credits. The rich, on
the other hand, have the ability to structure transactions for which there is at least a
technical argument that they are legal. Id. David Cay Johnston's recent book, which
contains explanations of some tax avoidance techniques of the wealthy, alludes to this
distinction in its title. DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT
CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER RICH EVERYBODY ELSE (2004).
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tax liabilities. In the most recent iteration of this "wraparound"
insurance gambit, insurance companies - with the likely complicity of
sophisticated, wealthy taxpayers - wrapped private placement hedge
fund interests inside variable insurance products in order to defer tax
on the ordinary income thrown off by such interests.' Thus, hedge
fund wrappers were being used primarily to convert ordinary income
into tax-sheltered income. 9
Although Congress has at times intervened in the history of this
game, to good effect, 10 it has left intact the tax subsidy for variable
insurance inside buildup and thereby the incentive for taxpayers to
exploit this preference." Congress has provided the Treasury and the
Internal Revenue Service (Service) with some authority to keep
variable insurance products from becoming ready, tax-preferred
substitutes for commonplace, taxable investments.
Exercising this
authority, however, has required the tax agencies to distinguish proper
risk-based returns from improper risk-based returns. 13
The
fundamental economic similarity of all risk-based returns makes this
See infra Part III.F.
Derivative instruments have similarly been used to convert ordinary income
hedge fund returns to long-term capital gains. See Lee A. Sheppard, Constructive
Ownership of a Bag of Dead Cats, 81 TAX NOTES 407, 407-08 (Oct. 26, 1998)
(describing this technique). Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code (Code) section
1260 to curtail the ability to use derivatives to effectuate conversion transactions. Its
enactment did make derivative-based conversion transactions more difficult, but
taxpayers quickly moved to insurance contracts as a derivative substitute. David M.
Schizer, Frictions as a Constrainton Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1368
(2001); see also Schizer, supra note 6, at 1935 (comparing hedge fund derivatives and
wraparound insurance).
10 See infra Part III.E.
11 In order to end the technique, Congress would need to take a more radical
8

9

approach to variable insurance products. Indeed, wraparound insurance is only one
of the tax avoidance techniques making use of insurance companies and their
products. See Lee A. Sheppard, Hedge Funds, Hogs, and PORC,TAX NOTES TODAY
(Nov. 1, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 214-20)
(discussing technique in which hedge funds "disguise themselves as offshore insurance
companies").
12 See infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text; see also
Lee A. Sheppard,
Hedge Funds in Insurance Wrappers, TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 23, 2002) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2002 TNT 185-4) (describing the agencies'
responses to wraparound insurance as their effort "to hold the line on the extent to
which life insurers become unregulated purveyors of tax-sheltered investment
products").
13 See Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-39 (explaining that the
agencies have been
able to find "no basis for a meaningful distinction between 'good' and 'bad' variable
annuities").
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line-drawing exercise ultimately impossible. 4
The tax agencies are frequently hampered by flaws in the

statutory base from which they must operate. One tax agency strategy
- the one used in the case of variable insurance products - is to raise

the cost of a particular avoidance technique so that it becomes less
attractive to most (if not all) taxpayers. Using this method, the
agencies have been able to arrive at a legal framework that has been

fairly effective at cutting back a particular iteration of the shelter, but
it is a framework that has also permitted the periodic flourishing of
new forms of wraparound insurance. As a result of its ability to
resolve immediate fairness concerns raised by a particular version of
the shelter, the agencies' framework may diminish the prospect of
broader legislative reform of the underlying systemic flaw."
Part II of this article provides a brief introduction to the insurance

terminology and tax treatment necessary to an understanding of
wraparound insurance contracts.16 Part III provides a detailed history

of the wraparound insurance technique and the government's
responses to it. 7 Readers familiar with variable insurance products
and the history of the wraparound insurance tax shelter may wish to
begin with Part IV, which assesses the effectiveness of the agencies'
responses and discusses alternative approaches that may better
further the goal of fundamental reform. Part V is the conclusion.
II.

INSURANCE PRODUCT AND TAX BACKGROUND

A. Annuity Contracts
Annuity contracts are structured in two phases. 18 First, during the
14 See David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in
the Tax
Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1627 (1999) (positing that "one can analyze doctrinal

rules in disparate areas of the tax law as a single class of problems problems").

line-drawing

15 See DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 93 (2000) (describing a
"widespread consensus ... that society would benefit from the use of a more
comprehensive tax base").
16 This article addresses non-qualified variable life insurance and annuities.
Although some of the early wraparound products were structured as group plans and
the tax agencies' actions had effects on those plans, qualified plans are now policed
through a different set of regulatory and legislative requirements.
17 The primary administrative tool is known as the "investor control doctrine,"
described infra Part III.
"8 This describes deferred annuities. Immediate annuities are also available.
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pays premiums

and

investment income builds up in the contract. In a fixed annuity, this
income builds up at a low rate guaranteed by the insurance company.
Following the accumulation phase, if the contract holder does not

elect to receive a lump sum payment, 9 the annuity contract enters the
annuitization phase during which the investment buildup (including

income that continues to accrue during annuitization) is turned into a
stream of periodic payments. 20 Annuitization has long been described

as "the reverse of life insurance ' ' 2' because the mortality bet made in
the case of an annuity tied to a life contingency is that
the contract
22
holder will have a long life rather than die prematurely.
Concerns that inflation could erode the benefits of fixed, low-rate
annuity contracts 23 prompted the Teachers Insurance and Annuity

Under these types of annuities, there is no accumulation phase. Instead, the contract
holder deposits a lump sum that is immediately turned into an income stream.
'9See Bridget O'Brian & Vanessa O'Connell, Annuity Sales May Suffer in
Clinton Plan to Tax an Exchange Between Accounts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1998, at C1
(stating that "only 1% of annuity holders" annuitize).
20 This payment stream may be made over the remainder
of the annuitant's life.
The payment stream may also be (and most commonly is) tied to a term of years. See
Tommy F. Thompson, Nonqualified Deferred Variable Annuities: A Productin Search
of a Coherent Theory, 79 N.D. L. REV. 439, 450-51, 456-57, 473-74 (2003) (discussing
fixed term annuities and life-contingent annuities).
Annuities tied to a life
contingency generally may not be surrendered for cash in order to prevent individuals
from using new information about their particular longevity to personal advantage.
See id. at 457 n.82.
21 See S.C. CYZIO, YOUR INSURANCE: ITS PROBLEMS AND THEIR SOLUTION
128
(1934) (describing annuitization as "the reverse of life insurance"); William Vickrey,
Insurance Under the Federal Income Tax, 52 YALE L.J. 554, 567 (1943) (using the
description "obverse of insurance").
A character in a Jane Austen novel quipped, "people always live for ever
when there is any annuity to be paid them...." JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND
SENSIBILITY 42 (Tony Tanner ed., Penguin Books 1986) (1811); see K. RAYMOND
CLARK, TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITIES 25 (1941) (explaining that
with annuitization, "the company risks longevity instead of premature death").
Some annuities do provide a guaranteed return of investment at death or some
other type of minimum death guarantee. These contract riders come at the price of
higher fees, and unlike life insurance death proceeds, this type of death benefit may
not be excluded from income under Code section 101. I.R.C. § 101; see Thompson,
supra note 20, at 481-83 (describing overpricing of death benefits sold with variable
annuities).
2- Typically, the insurance company would invest in conservative investments
such as bonds and mortgages. The contract would then guarantee a rate similar to
that available on these investments. See Carol V. Calhoun, Tax Law and the
Nonqualified Variable Annuity, 41 TAX LAW. 765, 765 (1988) (describing use of
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Association of America (TIAA) to establish in 1952 the first variable
annuity product, which was funded through the College Retirement

Equities Fund (CREF). 24 This first variable product was only offered
in conjunction with the fixed rate group insurance plans offered by
TIAA. Shortly after TIAA-CREF introduced the variable annuity,
three small companies began selling individual variable annuities. 25
Variable annuity products altered the fixed annuity in two
fundamental ways: "First, premiums collected [were] invested to a
greater degree in common stocks and other equities. Second, benefit26
payments var[ied] with the success of the investment policy.
Although fixed annuities had always had some investment flavor, the
returns were tied to contractually guaranteed rates. Thus, the variable
annuity product introduced risk-based returns into the staid world of
insurance, 27 and those investment risks were borne by the contract

conservative investments by insurance companies); Tamar Frankel, Variable
Annuities, Variable Insurance and SeparateAccounts, 51 B.U. L. REV. 177, 182 (1971)
(same).
24 In 1951, TIAA published a study demonstrating that "over a long period of
time, the average performance of equity securities far exceeded the rise in the cost of
living." Frankel, supra note 23, at 177.
25 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 95 (1959) (Harlan,
J., dissenting); see also Joseph W. Bartlett, Variable Annuities: Evolution and
Analysis, 19 STAN. L. REV. 150, 152 (1966) (discussing development of the first
commercial variable annuity company, the Variable Annuity Life Insurance
Company of America); Shirley Scheibla, Out of Retirement: After Years in the Courts,
Variable Annuities are Back in Business, BARRON'S, Feb. 22, 1965, at 3 (describing the
development of variable annuities).
26 Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. at 69. For more on the
development of early variable annuities, see Bartlett, supra note 25, at 151-53; J.
Edward Day, A Variable Annuity is Not a "Security," 32 NOTRE DAME LAW. 642, 66264 (1957); Frankel, supra note 23, at 177; Anthony M. Vernava, Tax Planningfor the
Not-So-Rich: Variable and Private Annuities, 11 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 14-17
(1969); Paul A. Johnston, Teachers Insurance Firm to Offer Equities Plan, BARRON'S,
Nov. 12, 1951, at 25 (describing TIAA's proposal to issue variable annuities).
27 There was significant opposition to the new products coming both
from the
mutual fund industry and from more conservative insurance companies, including
Metropolitan Life. These groups fought to keep states from enacting the legislation
necessary to permit variable annuities. For example, the first commercial variable
annuity company was organized in Washington, D.C., where enabling legislation was
not required. See Frankel, supra note 23, at 177-78 (describing opposition to the early
variable annuity products) (citations omitted); Paul A. Johnston, Variable Annuity
Opposed for Lack of Safeguards, BARRON'S, Sept. 19, 1955, at 30 (same); John C.
Perham, "Met" vs. "Pru": The Variable Annuity Touches Off a FinancialFree-For-All,
BARRON'S, Jan. 23, 1956, at 3 (describing "the first so-called variable annuity policy
ever offered to the general public").
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holder rather than by the insurance company. 28
At first, the primary legal question raised by these annuities was
whether they were insurance products regulated by the states or
"securities" subject to regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 29 In 1959, the Supreme Court alleviated some of

the uncertainty surrounding this issue by holding for the SEC in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Variable Annuity Life
Insurance Co. (VALIC).3 ° The Court held that it was necessary to
distinguish between fixed and variable annuities in order to preserve
the SEC's general oversight of the securities market." This result
28 See Armon Glenn, Variable Annuities: More Investors are Taking
the Plunge,
BARRONS, Jan. 17, 1977, at 11, 29 (describing the shift of investment risk to the
contract holder).
In the case of both fixed and variable annuities tied to a life contingency, the
insurance company bears the mortality risk that the annuitant will live longer than
expected. See also Day, supra note 26, at 676 (explaining the assumption of mortality
risk by the life insurance company); Joel H. Goldberg & Thomas P. Lemke,
Disclosureof Variable Annuity Tax Contingencies:Revenue Ruling 81-225 and the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, 15 CONN. L. REV. 433, 437 n.10 (1983)
(same). If the annuity payment stream is tied to a fixed number of years, the
mortality risk is shifted away from the insurance company. See Thompson, supra note
20, at 451 ("A variable annuity without life contingencies places both [mortality and
investment] risks on the policyholder.").
29 The SEC brought suit to enjoin the sale of these products
until they came into
compliance with federal securities law. See Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359
U.S. at 66; see also Frankel, supra note 23, at 179-80. In order to prevail, the SEC had
to demonstrate that the variable annuity was not "insurance." The McCarranFerguson Act provided that "[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance...." Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. at 67
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b)).
30 Id. at 65. Numerous articles have been devoted to this
opinion, the lower
court decisions, and the general issue of whether variable annuities should be
classified as securities. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 25 (describing the VALIC
decision, as well as subsequent SEC rulings and court cases about the treatment of
variable annuities as securities); Day, supra note 26, at 678; Frankel, supra note 23, at
178-80.
31 The majority opinion explained:

[W]e would not undertake to freeze the concepts of "insurance" or
"annuity" into the mold they fitted when these federal Acts were passed.
But we conclude that the concept of "insurance" involves some investment
risk-taking on the part of the company. The risk of mortality, assumed
here, gives these variable annuities an aspect of insurance. Yet it is
apparent, not real; superficial, not substantial .... For in common
understanding "insurance" involves a guarantee that at least some fraction
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raised the question of whether the inside buildup of variable annuities
would receive the same tax deferral as that granted to the inside
buildup of fixed annuities.
Following VALIC, Congress enacted the Life Insurance Company
Income Tax Act of 1959 (1959 Act),32 which "explicitly recognized
variable annuities as annuity contracts," thereby affirming that tax
deferral•• 33
would be afforded to the inside buildup of variable
annuities. The 1959 Act, using the product in VALIC as a template,
defined a variable contract narrowly as one for which payment was
"computed on the basis of ...the investment experience of the
company issuing the contract. 3 4 In 1962, Congress enacted legislation
permitting the return on variable annuities to be calculated based on
separate accounts,35 which allowed existing insurance companies more
easily to create variable products. The legislation also facilitated the
development of the first wraparound insurance product because the
legislation was interpreted to allow the marketing of variable

of the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. at 71. This language could be (and
was) construed to exempt from SEC regulation variable annuity products in which the
insurance company retained some of the investment risk, such as by offering a
minimum guarantee. The United Benefit Life Insurance Company, for example,
created a modification of the variable annuity that allowed policyholders a
guaranteed return of at least part of the premiums paid; this return was available even
prior to maturity. The Supreme Court intervened again and held that this
arrangement still constituted a security. SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S.
202 (1967); see Vernava, supra note 26, at 20 (describing United Benefit Life); Ronald
J. Axelrod, Note, Variable Annuity Held To Be Subject to Federal Securities
Regulation, 17 BUFF. L. REV. 495 (1967) (same); Note, Insurance-DeferredAnnuity
Policy Which Guarantees Return of 100 Per Cent of Net Premiums Not Subject to SEC
Regulation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 670, 673-74 (1967) (critiquing appellate court decision
in United Benefit Life).
32 The 1959 Act primarily dealt with issues of insurance company
taxation
unrelated to the VALIC decision and that are beyond the scope of this article. For a
discussion of the 1959 Act's effect on insurance companies, see Keith A. Tucker et al.,
Federal Taxation of Life Insurance Companies: The Evolution of a Tax Law
Responding to Change, 37 Sw. L.J. 891, 894-96 (1984). The 1959 Act was made
retroactive, thus it also applies to 1958. Id. at 894 n.13.
33 Calhoun, supra note 23, at 768.
Id. at 769. The 1959 Act's definition was a temporary measure that was later
made permanent in 1961. See Walter D. Vinyard, Jr., IRS Annuity Rulings Contradict
Public Policy on Retirement Savings, 36 Bus. LAW. 1765, 1768-69 (1981).
35 See Shirley Hobbs Scheibla, Threat to Variable Annuities: The IRS Soon
Will
Issue a New Ruling on Tax Deferral, BARRON'S, June 29, 1981, at 11, 24 (describing
1962 legislation permitting separate accounts).
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36

B. Life Insurance Products

Life insurance provides economic protection against the death of
the insured. There are two basic types of life insurance contracts.
First, term life is a policy that is in force only for a specific period,
typically one year. 37 Term life is pure insurance. 38 That is, the
premium is used entirely to pay for mortality charges (and other

expenses), and thus there is no premium available to yield an
investment return.3 9 Because mortality charges increase with age, the
price of term life insurance becomes prohibitive in later years. 40 The
second type, cash value life insurance, solved this problem by allowing

policyholders to pay premiums that in part are for insurance charges
and in part are to create an investment fund to be used in later years
to provide protection. 41
See id. at 24 (discussing the 1963 creation of the first company to sell
wraparound contracts).
The 1959 Act also imposed a company-level 28 percent tax on the capital gains
realized inside the separate accounts of commercial, non-qualified variable annuities.
See Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-37 to -38 (describing the company-level tax under
the 1959 Act); Glenn, supra note 28, at 30 (same). This company-level tax may have
slowed the sale of standard variable annuities but appears to have had little impact on
aggressive, tax avoidance variations on the variable annuity. Skillman, supra note 1,
at 40-38; see also infra note 87; Richard Goode, Policyholders' Interest Income from
Life Insurance Under the Income Tax, 16 VAND. L. REV. 33, 39 (1962) (discussing
general impact of the 1959 Act on insurance companies).
The tax on capital gains was put in place in order to ensure greater parity
between mutual funds and variable annuities. See Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-37 to 38; see also Johnston, supra note 27, at 31-32 (describing fears of mutual funds that
variable annuities "would have a tremendous tax advantage" if no capital gains tax
applied to the insurance companies).
37 Renewable term is available, as are term policies, for periods of
ten years or
more.
38 Because there is not an investment component, the deferral of tax on inside
36

buildup is not available. See infra Part II.C.
39 This is simplified. Premiums for term life, particularly for contracts
renewable
over a period of several years, likely reflect some discount reflecting time value of
money returns. See Tommy F. Thompson, The Tax Advantaged Treatment of Life
Insurance, 4 TAX L.J. 27, 33 & n.17 (1989). However, the convention has long been to
describe term policies as having little or no investment element. See CYzIo, supra
note 21, at 105-06 (describing term life as "pure insurance"); Goode, supra note 36, at
36 ("Term insurance policies ... involve little saving and interest earnings.").
40 See Thompson, supra note 39,
at 35-36.
41 See Cyzio, supra note 21, at 106-09 (describing
the development of cash value
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Fixed, cash value life insurance policies provided a low,
guaranteed return. 2 Individual, commercial variable life insurance
policies were not introduced until 1976, much later than variable
annuities." Like variable annuities, variable life insurance contracts
are designed to provide risk-based returns for which the policyholder
bears the investment risk. The insurance company continues to bear
the mortality risk 4
C. Inside Buildup Tax Treatment
As already discussed briefly in Part I, qualifying forms4 5 of life
insurance and annuities allow the owner of the contract to defer
paying taxes on the inside buildup until the buildup is withdrawn. 6
policies). At a certain point in time, the policy is not providing "insurance"
protection at all. Instead, the death benefit is paid from an investment reserve. See
Goode, supra note 36, at 34-35 (describing declining insurance and increasing
investment aspects of cash value life insurance).
42 See CYZIO, supra note 21, at 108 (stating that a typical
rate of return on cash
value life insurance "is usually 3% or 3
%"); Goode, supra note 36, at 35 n.3
(describing assumed rates of return in 1959 as ranging from 2 percent to 2 percent).
43 See VARIABLE CONTRACTS 36-37 (1995) (describing the
first commercial
variable life insurance contracts to be sold in the United States); Glenn, supra note 28,
at 30-31 (same).
Group variable life was available somewhat earlier, in approximately 1972.
Glenn, supra note 28, at 30-31 (describing development of group variable life
policies); see also Dana L. Thomas, Despite Equity Funding - Outlook for Insurance
Companies Has Never Been Brighter,BARRON'S, Apr. 16, 1973, at 17-18 (same); Dana
L. Thomas, More Aggressive Policy - Life Insurance Companies are Busily
Diversifying, Expanding, BARRON'S, Apr. 10, 1972, at 13 (describing initial proposals
for variable life plans).
Another important development in life insurance products was the creation in
1979 of the first flexible premium contract - known as "universal life." See
VARIABLE CONTRACTS, supra, at 56. Under these contracts, a policyholder is not
required to pay a set premium at a particular time interval. Thus, a policyholder
could choose to pay one very large premium at the outset. Universal life contracts
were combined with variable contracts to form variable universal life contracts.
Currently, a specific Code provision prevents single-premium policies from receiving
the full tax benefits afforded level-payment cash value life insurance. I.R.C. § 7702A.
44 See Thompson, supra note 39, at 52 (explaining the shift
of investment risk to
the policyholder).
45 See infra Part III.E.1 (describing definition of
life insurance).
46 In addition to the tax deferral on inside buildup, the Code treats distributions
from life insurance policies as first being return of premium rather than inside
buildup, thus allowing some deferral even when the policyholder has cash in hand. In
the case of life insurance, income tax deferral for inside buildup may become a
permanent exclusion if the policy is held until death of the owner. I.R.C. § 101.
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For example, if the owner pays a net premium of $100 into a
qualifying life insurance policy that provides for a 3% return, the $3
earned that year will not be taxed to the owner currently but will
instead only be taxed if it is withdrawn before the owner's death. In
contrast, if the same individual had invested $100 in a ten-year
certificate of deposit (CD) providing the same rate of return, the $3
would 41be taxed currently - whether or not withdrawn during that
Of course, purchasing life insurance is more costly than
year.
purchasing a CD. The insurance policy owner will need to have
invested more than $100 in order to cover the mortality charge and
48
other administrative expenses for that year.
The ostensible reason for the tax preference granted inside
buildup is to create an incentive for individuals to provide for their
loved ones at death or for themselves during retirement, 49 but it is far
from clear whether these tax benefits have had this intended effect.
First, underinsurance continues to be a widespread problem. 0 In
addition, term life insurance does not have any significant investment
component to which the beneficial treatment for inside buildup could
attach, nor is the purchase of term life insurance deductible, and yet,
term life insurance is the most common type of insurance." Finally,
insurance companies likely capture some of the tax benefit for inside
There is a narrow exception for death benefits paid on an insurance contract that has
been transferred for "valuable consideration." I.R.C. § 101(a)(2). Life insurance
proceeds are, however, included in the gross estate of a decedent for estate tax
purposes if the decedent possessed any "incidents of ownership" in the insurance
policy at the time of his death. I.R.C. § 2042; see Joseph M. Dodge, Substantial
Ownership and Substance Versus Form: Proposalsfor the Unification of FederalEstate
and Gift Taxes and for Taxation of Generation-Skipping Transfers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F.
657 (discussing the reform of the taxation of transferred property).
47 See Rev. Rul. 66-44, 1966-1 C.B. 94. This example is simplified. The amount
of the inclusion generally depends on application of the rules for original issue
I.R.C. § 1272; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 550:
discount.
INVESTMENT INCOME AND EXPENSES, at 13-14 (2003).
48 During later policy years, inside buildup may be used to cover such fees.
Although these expenses would not be deductible if paid for out of pocket, the inside
buildup used to pay such fees is permanently excluded from income since it can never
be distributed. See Goode, supra note 36, at 38 (describing this effect); Pike, supra
note 1, at 536-37 (same).
49 See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE
TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY PRODUCTS 2(1990).

See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crises:How the Law Should
Respond, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 26 (2001) (describing studies on underinsurance).
51 See Pike, supra note 1, at 530 (noting the "irrational inverse
relationship
between the need for insurance protection and the distribution of tax benefits").
50
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buildup. 1 2 Variable insurance contracts have notoriously high fees
that cut into the rate of return,53 which renders variable insurance
unsuitable for those in lower tax rate brackets. 5 4 Thus, the deferral for
inside buildup is a tax preference supported by flimsy justifications.55
When the tax avoidance techniques designed to exploit the deferral
are also considered, the deferral is a subsidy not worth the cost.
Although
various government players have
at times
recommended the wholesale repeal of the deferral on inside buildup,56
52 See Lee A. Sheppard, Rationalizing the Taxation of Financial
Intermediaries,

73 TAX NOTES 733, 735 (Nov. 11, 1996) (describing how insurers "claw[] back a lot of
the tax benefit through hefty fees and opaque pricing").
53 See, e.g., Kathy Chu, Variable Annuities. A Bad 'Wrap'?, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 4,
2004, at R7 (explaining that deferred variable annuities "have attracted a litany of
criticism because of their high fees"); Jonathan Clements, Defending a MuchMaligned Investment: When Variable Annuities Make Sense, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20,
2004, at D1 (describing the "sky-high fees" of variable annuities).
54 A similar phenomenon has been well documented in the case
of tax-exempt
bonds. See, e.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A
PLANNING APPROACH 118-20 (3d ed. 2005) (discussing implicit taxes on lightly taxed
investments); Daniel N. Shaviro, The Story of Knetsch: Judicial Doctrines Combating
Tax Avoidance, in TAX STORIES 318 (Paul Caron ed., 2003) (using tax-exempt bonds
to illustrate "the tendency in some circumstances for market forces to eliminate
through price changes any after-tax benefit").
55 See David F. Bradford, The Case for a Personal Consumption
Tax, in WHAT
SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 75, 90-91 (Joseph A. Pechman ed.,
1980) (highlighting the deferral for inside buildup as one of the complex problems of
the income tax); Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 6, at 798-99 (questioning why life
insurance products are treated differently from OID obligations); Goode, supra note
36, at 33 (discussing the inconsistency in treatment between life insurance and other
investment types); Pike, supra note 1, at 578 (arguing that "the investment income
credited to cash value life insurance contracts should be taxed currently"); Vickrey,
supra note 21, at 561 ("[T]he savings part of the life insurance contract should
obviously be treated as any other form of savings .... ").
56 For example, proposals to curtail the benefits arising from deferral
for inside
buildup were floated by the Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton
administrations. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT
GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX

84-85 (1987) (describing Reagan administration proposals); Bridget
O'Brian, Clinton Plan for Annuities is Clarified, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at C18
(describing Clinton administration's proposal to "make exchanges between variable
annuities taxable, as well as transfers between variable and fixed annuities"): Vanessa
O'Connell, Clinton's Plan on Annuities is Nearly Dead, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1998, at
C20 (describing Clinton as "the third president in a row to attempt to alter annuities'
tax status"); Ellen E. Schultz and Karen Slater, Buyers Guide: This May Be Last
Chance to Purchase Annuities, but Use Caution, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 1992, at C1
(describing Bush administration proposal to strip most individual annuities of tax
REFORM
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such legislation has never been implemented.57 The insurance lobby is
powerful.' 8

Congressional efforts have instead largely focused on

restricting the deferral for inside buildup to particular types of life
insurance and annuity contracts. 59 Thus, because Congress has so far

been unable (or unwilling) to remove entirely the preference for
inside buildup, 60 a gray zone has persisted that is conducive to the
development of aggressive tax avoidance schemes.
D. Loans and Withdrawals

The amount of benefit available from the tax deferral on inside
buildup depends on the contract holder's ability to refrain for multiple
years from drawing down cash value through partial or full
surrender. 6 ' The principal way to tap into the cash value of a life

insurance or annuity policy without actually making a withdrawal is to

deferral).
57 See Pike, supra note 1, at 578 (arguing that Congress is unlikely
to take action
"because the preferential tax treatment of cash value life insurance is based more on
politics than on tax policy analysis").
"' One of the fights over government proposals to tax inside buildup was
described in BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 56, at 85:
Full-page advertisements in Time, Newsweek, People, U.S. News & World
Report, and Sports Illustrated carried sets of three postcards intended for
mailing to each reader's senators and representatives. Insurance agents
were given similar postcard sets, which they passed out to their clients. A
videotape, entitled David and Goliath, Round Two, was used to whip up
opposition to the tax plan among the life insurance industry's many
minions, and offered step-by-step instructions on how to personally lobby
members of Congress.... As a result, Congress was deluged by postcards
from voters, with members receiving more than a million pieces of mail on
the arcane subject during the first half of 1985.
See also Charles Gasparino, Annuities' Tax Status Is Stable, for Now, WALL ST. J.,
June 22, 1998, at C24 (discussing the power of the insurance lobby); Sheppard, supra
note 12 ("[T]he life insurance industry lobby is formidable ... ").
59 See infra Part III.E for a discussion of these congressional reforms.
60 Less radical legislative changes might also be effective. See Thompson, supra
note 20, at 508-20 (suggesting proposals that would create a stronger distinguishing
line between variable annuities and other investments).
61 Partial surrender or withdrawal of cash value life insurance became
widely
available only in the late 1970s with the introduction of universal life. See VARIABLE
CONTRACrs, supra note 43, at 60 (describing introduction of partial withdrawal). As
described infra at Part III.B, investment annuities, which were variable annuities
designed to exploit the deferral on inside buildup, allowed for partial withdrawals.
See Vinyard, supra note 34, at 1768 (describing partial annuity redemptions).
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take out a loan secured by the cash value.

62

Loans made against the

cash value of annuities were received on a tax-free basis until 1982
when Congress enacted a provision requiring that all loans, pledges,

or assignments of annuity cash value be treated the same as
withdrawals. 63

Loan proceeds secured by the cash value of life

insurance, however, continue to be received tax-free. 64
Prior to the 1982 legislation, withdrawals of cash values of both
annuities and life insurance were taxed on the assumption that

investment in the contract was withdrawn first. Thus, only the excess
of the accumulated withdrawals over contract investment was taxed.65
This first-in, first-out ("FIFO") treatment allowed for a greater period
of deferral on inside buildup. While withdrawals from annuities
(other than distributions received as annuitization payments) are now
taxed on an income first, investment last basis, life insurance
withdrawals still receive the favorable FIFO treatment.66
62 Additionally, if the loan interest were deductible, a taxpayer could
run a nice

tax arbitrage machine. See Vickrey, supra note 21, at 564 n.20 (describing a technique
in which a taxpayer borrows on a single premium policy, takes a deduction for interest
paid, uses the loan proceeds to purchase another policy, and enjoys deferral on any
interest earned on policy reserves); see also Shaviro, supra note 54, at 313 (detailing
the story of an individual who tried and failed at using a similar scheme). In 1942,
Congress restricted the ability of taxpayers to deduct interest on indebtedness used to
purchase life insurance. For the current version of this rule, see I.R.C. § 264.
However, the general effectiveness of this provision is in doubt. See Vickrey, supra
note 55, at 564 n.20 (describing the expectation that the "provision would prove even
less effective than has the parallel provision denying a deduction for interest paid on
indebtedness incurred to carry tax exempt bonds").
63 See infra Part III.E.2.
64 See Pike, supra note 1, at 534-36 (critiquing the ability to take tax-free
loans
on cash value life insurance).
65 See Goldberg & Lemke, supra note 28, at 451 (describing the pre-TEFRA
rules for annuities); Pike, supra note 1, at 534-36 (criticizing the investment-first rule
for life insurance); see also Putting Together a Portable Pension, Bus. WK., May 11,
1981, at 142 (describing the tax advantages of the first-in, first-out rule for annuities).
Annuitization payments are subject to a different tax regime. In general, a
portion of the payment is considered a tax-free return on investment while another
portion is taxable return on investment. I.R.C. § 72(b). The ratio of the taxed to
untaxed portion has varied over time. For discussion on the taxation of regular
annuity payments during different time periods, see J. BLAKE LOWE & JOHN D.
WRIGHT, SELLING LIFE INSURANCE THROUGH A TAX APPROACH 67 (1936); Calhoun,
supra note 23, at 766 n.4; Vernava, supra note 26, at 10-11; and Vickrey, supra note
21, at 568-70.
66 See infra Part III.E.2. In addition, contract holders may be able to access
inside buildup by constructing a hedge outside the contract that would lock in the
investment gain inside the contract and provide cash to the policyholder. See infra
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III. VARIABLE INSURANCE PRODUCTS: HISTORY OF AN
AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUE

A. Summary
As described above in Part II, near-perfect conditions for the
formation of a tax shelter involving variable annuities prevailed in the
early 1960s.
Much of the uncertainty surrounding the SEC's
treatment of these products had been resolved.67 Congress had
sanctioned tax deferral on inside buildup and allowed returns to be68
tied to segregated funds rather than to company-wide performance.
Loans provided easy access to inside buildup, and withdrawals were
taxed on a favorable, investment-out-first basis. 69 Three prominent
wraparound annuity products were marketed between 1965 and 1981:
the investment annuity, the savers' annuity, and the mutual fund
annuity.
As described in greater detail below, in response to these
products, the tax agencies developed three requirements that variable
contracts must meet in order to receive favorable tax treatment. First,
contract holders are generally prohibited from having too many
incidents of ownership with respect to the assets underlying the
variable contract. Second, contract holders are prohibited from
allocating premiums directly to publicly available investments.
Finally, contract holders may only allocate premiums to diversified
investments.
The first requirement applies general tax ownership
standards" to the variable insurance context. The second is a sourcing
rule prohibiting direct allocation to publicly available investments and
is intended to prevent contract holders from allocating premiums to
investments they could own outside the variable contract. Similarly,
notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
67 Scheibla, supra note 25, at 3 (describing the removal of securities law "legal
roadblocks").
6' See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
69 See supra Part II.D.
70 See infra Part III.E.3.
71 The distinction between "standards" and "rules" has been the subject of
numerous law review articles. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); see also Avery Weiner Katz, The
Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
496, 515 (2004) (describing the numerous ways in which this distinction between rules
and standards has been framed); David A. Weisbach, Comment on The Tax Shelter
Battle, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 30, 35-36 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel
Slemrod eds., 2004) (discussing the significance of standards in tax law).
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the diversification requirement (which Congress has codified) is
meant to make it difficult for taxpayers to create synthetically inside
the variable contract an investment they could own outside the
contract. The first two requirements are referred to together as the
"investor control" doctrine.
Beginning in 1982, Congress enacted legislation intended to curb
the investment orientation of insurance products. For example,
Congress limited access to annuity inside buildup by imposing
withdrawal penalties. 72 Congress also codified the diversification
requirement, and in doing so provided that diversification could be
attained by looking-through to the assets of qualifying investment
entities underlying variable contracts. 3 As a result, instead of
counting a mutual fund underlying a variable contract as a single
asset, the investments held by the mutual fund will count towards
meeting diversification, making the requirement easier to meet. The
Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides look-through treatment for
trusts or mutual funds whose beneficial interests are owned only by
the accounts of insurance companies (with some exceptions).
Through regulation, the tax agencies extended this look-through rule
to partnerships but they allowed it to apply to private placement
partnerships 74 whether or not all of the partnership interests were
owned by insurance company accounts.75 Starting in the late 1990s,
taxpayers asserted that this look-through rule for private placement
partnerships allowed the development of hedge fund wrappers. The
tax agencies responded by correcting the look-through rule and reemphasizing the primacy of the investor control doctrine.
B. The "Investment Annuity"
76

In 1963, First Investment Annuity Co. (FIAC) was organized.
The founder envisioned using Congress's 1962 legislation to "create a
separate account for each purchaser of a variable annuity and let him
control the investments. 7 7 This proposal was submitted to the Service
72

See infra Part III.E.2.

73 I.R.C.

§ 817(h)(4).

74 These are partnerships subject to fewer securities law reporting requirements

because interests are marketed only to a limited group of sophisticated investors.
75 Current regulations only allow the look-through rule to apply to partnerships
whose beneficial interests are owned by insurance accounts and certain other
qualified investors. See infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
76 Scheibla, supra note 35, at 24.
77 Id.
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which reportedly "stud[ied] the plan for two years" and then "gave its
approval.

78

The first "investment annuity" was sold in 1965. 79 This

product was similar to the variable annuity because its return was tied
to the market value of an underlying account. 8° However, over time,
several features were added that made this product significantly more

attractive from a tax perspective than the ordinary variable annuity.
The investment annuity allowed policyholders to select and
control the underlying account assets." The policyholders could also82

designate a manager to control the account assets on their behalf.
The only limitation on the policyholders' discretion with respect to
these assets was that they could only select from investments that
were on an "approved list."83 The list for investment annuities
included "publicly traded securities, while in other cases the list [was]
restricted to Federally insured bank deposit instruments."
In some
cases these lists were so extensive that they would have provided
almost no restraint on the policyholders' discretion. 85The assets
78

Id.

See Vinyard, supra note 34, at 1767-68 (describing the development and
features of the investment annuity); Justices Hold Insurance Credit Practices Must
Conform to FederalLending Laws, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1980, at 12.
,Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 685 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd,
609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
8" Id; see also Rev. Rul. 77-85, 1977-1 C.B. 12 (describing the policyholder's
control over account direction); Steven S. Anreder, Attractive 'Wrapper': The
Investment Annuity Has Begun to Catch On, BARRON'S, Nov. 17, 1975, at 3
(describing as "a prime attraction of the investment annuity" that the contract holder
retained management over the underlying assets).
82 FIAC Advertisement, BARRON'S, Nov. 29, 1971, at 2 (advertising
that "the
buyer can select his own investment manager: stockbroker, bank, mutual fund,
investment advisor").
83 See Howard Stecker et al., Separate Account Products: A Story of Natural
Selection Along the Insurance Product Continuum, TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 5, 1998)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 98 TNT 150-28) (describing the lists).
84 Rev. Rul. 77-85, 1977-1 C.B. 12.
85 Gair Petrie, Eroding the Tax Benefits of Wrap-Around
Annuities: An Analysis
of Revenue Ruling 81-225, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 95, 99 n.32 (1981):
79

Investments approved by the First Investment Annuity Company of
America included: securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange;
mutual funds; United States and Canadian Government Bonds; certificates
of deposit; savings accounts; debt instruments of corporations which would
reasonably be expected to be listed on an exchange regulated by the
Securities Exchange Commission; commercial paper; term life insurance;
and any other asset which met the company's standard for acceptability,
which basically required a regular market in the asset.
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underlying the annuity were held not by the insurance company but
86

by a bank custodian or brokerage firm.
Contract holders could make premium payments by transferring
financial assets they already owned into the annuity, so long as such
assets were on the approved list of underlying annuity investments. 87
Policyholders were not, however, able to take cash or assets directly
out of the custodial account. Instead, they were required to complete
a full or partial surrender of the annuity with the insurance company.88
The company would direct the custodian to liquidate a portion of the
assets and turn the money over to it, and the company would then
make the cash payment to the shareholders. 89 Taxpayers also had the
See also Anreder, supra note 81, at 3 (describing permissible assets).
86 Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 685 n.1
(D.D.C. 1977),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Stecker et al., supra note 83 (describing the
custodial system for investment annuities).
87 See Rev. Rul. 77-85, 1977-1 C.B. 12. The transfer of
appreciated assets to
these accounts would, however, have triggered gain recognition. This may have
operated as some deterrent on the movement of previously held portfolio assets into
these accounts. See Petrie, supra note 85, at 100-01 (describing gain recognition
triggered by transfer of appreciated assets); Anreder, supra note 81, at 20 (same).
As described supra at note 65, the taxation of net capital gains at the insurance
company level seems to have had little effect on the desirability of the investment
annuity for individuals. See also Robert Metz, Market Place: Using Annuities as Tax
Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1976, at 42 (describing growth of investment annuities in
spite of the capital gains tax); cf. Anreder, supra note 81, at 3 (reporting that "some
people" contended that the capital gains tax would make the investment annuity less
desirable). In the investment annuity context, the companies apparently passed this
capital gains tax on directly to the contract holder by debiting the account. See id.
(describing how company-level capital gains triggered a reduction in a contract
holder's account).
Code section 817(b) was enacted in 1984 and effectively ended taxation at the
life insurance company level on the investment returns, including capital gains,
generated by the separate accounts of variable contracts. I.R.C § 817(b); see
Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-41 (explaining this legislation).
88 See Rev. Rul. 77-85, 1977-1 C.B. 12.
But see Anreder, supra note 81, at 20
("After a stated period of time, most plans allow withdrawals (at times with the
aforesaid penalty fee).").
Amounts withdrawn would have been taxed under favorable, investment-first
treatment. See Donald C. Alexander, Alexander Challenges IRS Authority to Add
Limitations on Policyholder Control of Deferred Variable Annuity Contracts, TAX
NOTES TODAY (June 7, 1990) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 90 TNT 12023) (explaining the investment-first treatment).
89 See Rev. Rul. 77-85, 1977-1 C.B. 12.
Of course, at each step, the custodian
and/or the insurance company would extract a fee. In addition to transaction-specific
fees, the custodian collected a monthly fee and the insurance company a yearly fee.
See Petrie, supra note 85, at 100 (describing typical fees); Anreder, supra note 81, at
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ability to borrow money from annuities (or otherwise pledge annuities
as collateral) without being subject to taxation. 90
Although
. ..
91 investment annuities created significant tax avoidance
possibilities, beginning in 1965 and continuing for just over ten years,
the Service issued numerous private letter rulings holding that such
custodial accounts qualified as life insurance company accounts. 92
Thus, although the Service had access to information about the basic

contours of the investment annuities, it did not act to limit the product
until the product became more widespread. For nearly a decade, only
one company - FIAC - offered the investment annuity. 93 The first

policies were group plans designed primarily for public school
teachers, 94 and there was a relatively small likelihood of abuse. 95 It is

therefore not surprising that the Service issued favorable private letter
rulings and even one favorable revenue ruling.96 In addition, it is
doubtful whether FIAC emphasized the tax benefits when requesting

the private letters for these group investment annuities. For example,
the favorable revenue ruling did not describe the unique features of

20 (describing typical fees); Metz, supra note 87, at 42 (quoting an observer who
described the fees as "the price of admission to the shelter").
90 See supra Part II.A.
91 Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1,
3 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (describing
tax benefits of the investment annuity); see also Alexander, supra note 88 (stating that
through an investment annuity, "a taxpayer could have converted virtually any
currently taxable income stream into a tax-deferred variable annuity"); Anreder,
supra note 81, at 3 (describing tax savings).
92 See Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 685
n.2 (D.D.C. 1977),
rev'd, 609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979); A. H. Doggart, Letters to the Editor,5 TAx NOTES
23, 24 (Feb. 28, 1977) (describing favorable letter rulings); Petrie, supra note 85, at
100 (stating that there were "about seventy favorable letter rulings"); Tax Briefs, Bus.
WK., May 9, 1977, at 114 (quoting vice president of First Investment Annuity Co. as
saying that the "IRS issued one public ruling and 75 private rulings upholding the
idea").
93 See Metz, supra note 87, at 42 ("Until a year ago, all investors bought
their
annuities from the pioneer, the First Investment Annuity Company of America, a
small Valley Forge, Pa., concern.").
94 See Calvin H. Johnson, ProfessorJohnson Replies, Letter to the Editor,
5 TAX
NOTES 24, 26 (Feb. 29, 1977) (describing investment annuities sold to teachers'
qualified pension plans); Treasury GrandfathersInvestment Annuities, 5 TAX NOTES
21, 21 (Mar. 14, 1977) (same).
95 See Johnson, supra note 94, at 26 (explaining that the favorable
rulings were
an error that "at first was a small one").
96 Rev. Rul. 68-488, 1968-2 C.B. 188; see Treasury Grandfathers Investment
Annuities, supra note 94, at 21 (explaining that this ruling did not address purchaser
control over investments).
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the investment annuity. 97
FIAC was not, however, content to provide retirement services to
school teachers and turned to promoting the investment annuities to
wealthy
individuals98
as
effective
tax-sheltering
devices. 99
Notwithstanding the expanded possibility for tax avoidance, the
Service issued favorable private letter rulings for these individual

investment annuities. The letter ruling requests submitted by FIAC
may have downplayed facts that would have led the Service to
recognize the tax avoidance possibilities. A favorable letter ruling
issued in 1972, for example, did not mention the lists of approved

securities or otherwise emphasize the contract holder's control9
Instead, the ruling stated only "[t]he contract holder retains the right
to direct the Custodian as to investment activity with respect to the
investments in the account but cannot receive any payments from the
account."' 0 ' The ruling emphasized that any amounts earned on the
contract would be paid only to the insurance company and that the
custodian and annuity agreements were "irrevocable., 10 2
No

The ruling specifically addressed a question unrelated to contract holder
control: "Whether employer payments under an investment arrangement are
contributions to purchase section 403(b) annuity contracts where the employee is
entitled to benefits immediately after the initial payment by the employer." Rev. Rul.
68-488, 1968-2 C.B. 188.
98 The timeframe is not entirely clear, but these individual
investment annuities
appear to have first been issued in the early 1970s. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 72-04041250A (Apr. 4, 1972) (stating that FIAC was "preparing to offer to the public an
annuity arrangement"); Anreder, supra note 81, at 3 (explaining that individual
investment annuity purchases "quadrupled in 1974, to $36.2 million, from 1973's $9.4
million"); FIAC Advertisement, BARRON'S, Mar. 9, 1970, at 9 (FIAC advertisement
for individual investment annuities).
99 Advertisements by FIAC that appeared in Barron's are revealing.
See, e.g.,
FIAC Advertisement, BARRON'S, Mar. 15, 1971, at 12 ("Expecting a Pension or ProfitSharing Plan distribution? You may also expect a big tax headache."); FIAC
Advertisement, BARRON'S, May 17, 1971, at 29 (describing the product as "a tax
shelter"); FIAC Advertisement, supra note 82, at 2 ("Like all annuities, it offers taxshelter advantages. Alone among annuities, however, it offers certain unique
advantages."); see also Johnson, supra note 94, at 26 (describing FIAC as having
"used the easement for a little brick road to build its eight-lane interstate").
100I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 72-04-041250A (Apr. 4, 1972).
97

101 Id.

Id.

After the Internal Revenue Service (Service) took action against
investment annuities, insurance representatives did not distinguish between the group
and individual policies.
For example, the insurance companies reacted by
emphasizing that the policies had also been purchased by "public service individuals":
"Anthony H. Doggart, president of Investment Annuity, said yesterday that his
company at present had about 15,000 such policies outstanding for such public service
102
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discussion was included about the possibility of surrendering the
contract.
Beginning in 1975, other insurance companies began offering
versions of the investment annuity. 10 3 Starting in late 1975, a cluster of
stories appeared in the financial and popular press dubbing the
investment annuity the "wraparound annuity" and describing it as a
tax shelter used by wealthier individuals.' 4 In a memorandum
submitted in the only reported court case involving investment
annuities, 10 5 the Service stated that it had decided to begin a

"reconsideration of their earlier private letter ruling policy" because
of the stories by "tax experts [and] tax financial journalists" who had
"fully perceived
the tax avoidance capability in investment
annuities. , ' °6
0
The Service warned publicly in October 1976 of its decision to
reconsider investment annuities.

°7

In March 1977,

the Service

individuals as school teachers in a total of 39 states." Tax Ruling by the I.R.S. Could
Affect FutureSales of Investment Annuities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1977, at D5.
103 See Metz, supra note 87, at 42 (describing the growth in investment annuity
offerings). By early 1977, eleven companies were offering investment annuities. See
A Tax Break Falls, Bus. WK., Mar. 21, 1977, at 44 (describing eleven companies as
selling investment annuities worth $500 million); Anreder, supra note 81, at 3 ("FIAC
has a big jump on its rivals. But the competitive pace is heating up."); IRS Triggers
Investment Annuities Protest,4 TAx NOTEs 15, 15 (Dec. 20, 1976) ("[A]pproximately
$500 million in investment annuities have been sold by 11 companies."); Tax Men
Question Investment Annuities, Bus. WK., Oct. 18, 1976, at 112 ("Since... last
January, insurance companies have written close to $250 million worth of investment
annuities.").
104 See Anreder, supra note 81, at 3 (describing the benefits of the
investment
annuity to individuals "in tax brackets of 30% and higher"); Metz, supra note 87, at 42
(describing advantages of investment annuity); The Tax Break In Investment
Annuities, Bus. WK., Feb. 9, 1976, at 74 (same).
FIAC, of course, took issue with the descriptions of its products as tax shelters.
Doggart, supra note 92, at 23 (describing the investment annuity with the phrase
"[s]carcely a tax shelter"). Their own advertisements, however, belie their defense.
See supra note 99.
105 Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 685 (D.D.C.
1977), rev'd,
609 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1979), discussed supra at note 91.
106 Id. at 693 (quoting from a Service memorandum); see
Goldberg & Lemke,
supra note 28, at 443-44 (describing shift in agency stance on investment annuities);
Petrie, supra note 85, at 100.
107 Inv. Annuity, Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 685 n.2; see Calvin H. Johnson, Changing
the Rules on Investment Annuities: The Problem of Grandfathers and Past Years, 5
TAX NoTEs 5, 6 (Jan. 31, 1977) (describing the Oct. 20, 1976 news release); Tax Men
Question Investment Annuities, supra note 103, at 112 (discussing the Service's
intention "to alter the investment annuity's tax status"); see also IRS Triggers

HeinOnline -- 25 Va. Tax Rev. 150 2005-2006

2005]

WraparoundInsurance Tax Shelters

issued Revenue Ruling 77-85,109 which held that the contract holders

and not the custodians or insurance companies were the true owners
of the assets inside the custodial accounts.1 The ruling explained that
while the Code did contemplate that policyholders could "bear the
investment risk with respect to segregated asset accounts of the

insurance company," it did not cover assets over which the
policyholders had "direct investment control and [could] exercise
other incidents of ownership. 111 The ruling emphasized the "bundle
of rights" held by the individual policyholder and pointed to escrow

and trust cases in which persons who placed the property in those
vehicles were deemed to be the owners of that property.'

Thus, the

Investment Annuities Protest, supra note 103, at 15 (describing how the Service's
announcement "triggered letters of protest from two members of Congress").
Lobbying efforts on the part of the insurance industry began almost
immediately. Investment Annuity Decision Left to Democrats, 5 TAx NOTES 3, 3 (Jan.
31, 1977) (describing lobbying efforts led by FIAC).
108 The presidential election between Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford
took place
in 1976. Thus, the proposal made to end the favorable treatment for investment
annuities was raised by the Ford Treasury and implemented by the Carter Treasury.
See Investment Annuity Decision Left to Democrats, supra note 107, at 3 ("The fact
that the IRS, in a pro-business Republican administration, was willing to reverse
itself.., is taken by some tax experts as evidence the IRS made an obvious mistake
when it issued the initial rulings ....
").Agency action taken to constrain wraparound
insurance has been consistently bipartisan. See infra note 148 (Carter and Reagan
administrations) and Part III.F (current Bush administration).
109 Rev. Rul. 77-85, 1977-1 C.B. 12. Revenue Ruling 77-85 was made
prospective
only, although the grandfathering of previously established investment annuities was
subject to two conditions. First, no further contributions could be made to these
accounts after the date of the ruling release, which was March 9, 1977. Id. at 15.
Second, the account assets had to be "consistently treated as the property of the
insurance company for all purposes under.., the Code." Id. This second restriction
would have required contract holders to yield investment control to the insurance
companies. See Johnson, supra note 107, at 6-7 (arguing that any Service authority
should not allow grandfathering for existing contracts).
110See Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-38 (describing the Service's change in
position on investment annuities and the issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-85); A Tax
Break Falls, supra note 103, at 44 (same); IRS Ends Deferral Granted Investment
Annuity Contracts, WALL ST.J., Mar. 10, 1977, at 3 (same); Tax Briefs, supra note 92,
at 114 (same).
The insurance companies reacted by emphasizing that the policies had also been
purchased by "public service individuals." See supra note 102.
ill Rev. Rul. 77-85, 1977-1 C.B. 12, 14 (emphasis in original).
12 Id. at 14, 15.
The specific case referenced in the Revenue Ruling was
Northern Trust Co. of Chicago v. United States, 193 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1951). In
Northern Trust, the buyer of stock had the seller deposit the shares in escrow until the
full purchase price was paid over time. The buyer of the stock had the right to vote
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ruling is essentially a pure application of constructive ownership
principles,' and1 4it is generally considered the first of the "investor
control" rulings.'
After the issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-85, the Service
continued to struggle with its policy on wraparound insurance
products. 115 For example, in August 1977, months after the issuance
the shares. Dividends paid on the stock were paid over to the seller but also reduced
the remaining amount owing by the buyer. The court, quoting Justice Frankfurter,
explained: "We cannot too often reiterate that taxation is not so much concerned with
the refinements of title as it is with actual command over the property taxed - the
actual benefit for which the tax is paid." 193 F.2d at 129 (quoting Griffiths v.
Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 357 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Seventh Circuit held that the buyer was the owner of the shares and thus would be
taxed on the dividends paid on the shares while they remained in escrow. Id. at 131.
113 Two of the most well known cases in this area are Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S.
376 (1930), and Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331 (1940). These cases were both
cited in the investor control rulings issued in 2003; see infra Part III.F. See also
Internal Revenue Service, Regs Target Use of Annuity Contracts, Life Insurance As
Tax Avoidance Vehicles, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 30, 2003) (LEXIS FEDTAX lib.,
TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 146-11, n.3) ("These [investor control] rulings apply
general concepts of ownership that have developed in case law ....); Petrie, supra
note 85, at 95 n.2 (describing the application of "Clifford's logic" to wraparound
annuities). For a discussion of Corliss, see Patricia A. Cain, The Story of Earl: How
Echoes (and Metaphors) from the Past Continue to Shape the Assignment of Income
Doctrine, in TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME
TAX CASES 275, 278 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003). For a discussion of both Corliss and
Clifford, see JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE,
STRUCTURE, AND POLICY 824-25 (3d ed. 2004).
114 Cf David S. Neufeld, The 'Keyport Ruling' and the Investor Control Rule:
Might Makes Right?, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 20, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT
file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 14-51) (describing this ruling as the "false progenitor" of
investor control).
115 This may have resulted from actions taken by insurance companies
negatively
affected by the ruling. The companies petitioned Congress to overturn it through
legislation. See Petrie, supra note 85, at 101-02 (describing the effort to overturn the
ruling); Scheibla, supra note 35, at 24.
The Carter administration proposed codification of Revenue Ruling 77-85.
Neither side was able to convince Congress to act. See Goldberg & Lemke, supra
note 28, at 447-48 (describing failure to get congressional action about the revenue
ruling); Vinyard, supra note 34, at 1770 (describing Carter administration proposal).
In addition to pursuing a legislative solution, FIAC and its parent filed a lawsuit
in which they sought "a declaratory judgment that Revenue Ruling 77-85 is unlawful,
beyond statutory authority, and in violation of the Internal Revenue Code." Inv.
Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 442 F. Supp. 681, 686 (D.D.C. 1977), rev'd, 609 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1979). The plaintiffs also sought "injunctive relief to restrain the
defendants from implementing Revenue Ruling 77-85...." Id. The plaintiff
prevailed in the district court, which held that it was compelled "to conclude that
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of Revenue Ruling 77-85, the Service issued a favorable letter ruling
for an annuity that was identical to the investment annuity except that6
11
the insurance company, rather than a custodian, held the accounts.
This letter ruling was hastily revoked' 7 after FIAC brought it forward
during the course of litigation over Revenue Ruling 77-85.'
The
Service, however, continued to issue favorable letter rulings for other

Revenue Ruling 77-85 is erroneous and unreasonable, and therefore unlawful and
beyond the Service's statutory authority." Id. at 688. The case was reversed on
appeal on a procedural point.
The district court held that the contract holders needed to retain "total control"
before being deemed the owners of the investment annuity assets. Id. at 690-91. The
court specifically described the Clifford case as requiring such an approach. See supra
note 113. The court explained that the "investment annuity policyholders have
manifestly effected a 'substantial change' in their economic positions. While they
retain investment control over the account assets, they by no means retain control
over such assets 'in all essential respects' as before the investment." Inv. Annuity,
Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 690. The court then went on to identify the ways in which
policyholders' rights were impaired: "[P]olicyholders are unable to receive the
account assets back in kind ... and they may not receive any amount directly from the
account." Id. These points were also made in the early, favorable private letter
rulings. The court noted that if the policyholder surrendered the contract, "he would
have to pay full taxes at that time for any appreciation in the account assets ....
" Id.
at 691. That this tax deferral was the point of the investment annuity did not
influence the court. See Petrie, supra note 85, at 108-10 (discussing the ways in which
the court's logic was "patently incorrect"). The court did, however, emphasize that
for just over ten years the Service had issued favorable rulings to investment annuity
companies: "While such a reconsideration of policy may indeed be desirable,
Congress, not the Internal Revenue Service, is the appropriate body to consider such
substantive changes in the tax laws." Inv.Annuity, Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 693.
116 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-47-111 (Aug. 29, 1977).
For example, the ruling
describes in detail an "acceptable assets list," the ability of contract holders to make
in-kind contributions to the account, and includes a full paragraph about the contract
holder's ability to direct investments inside the annuity and the shifting of investment
risk caused by this arrangement.
117 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-47-111 was revoked by I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 78-05-020
(Sept. 13, 1977). The revocation letter stated that the revocation was required
because "on our subsequent analysis of the application of Rev. Rul. 77-85 ...[that
letter] was in error." The letter even contained an apology: "We regret the
inconvenience our mistake has caused you." I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-05-020 (Sept. 13,
1977).
18 Inv. Annuity, Inc., 442 F. Supp. at 686. The ruling was issued to
one of the
plaintiff's competitors. Id. The ruling was raised in the Investment Annuity case
described supra note 115. The district court stated that the private ruling "raised
grave questions about the propriety of Revenue Ruling 77-85." Id. at 686 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Scheibla, supra note 35, at 24, 26 (describing the
issuance of the ruling to FIAC's competitor and the reaction of the district court).
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annuities that were similar in structure to the investment annuity.1 '9
The limitations of the investor control doctrine were not evident
immediately following issuance of the investment annuity revenue
ruling. The insurance companies selling the investment annuity did
not assert that the Service's ruling was meaningless; indeed, the
revenue ruling ended the investment annuity and put its sellers out of
business.12 Even in the investment annuity, however, one can see the
obstacle that would face the tax agencies in future wraparound
insurance iterations. Because the investment annuity allowed a clear

view of an identical investment existing both inside and outside the
contract, that vehicle dramatically revealed the inconsistency between
the tax treatment of returns inside and outside variable contracts.
That same inconsistency is present in even the most S•plain-vanilla
121
variable contracts sold today; it is just less obvious.

This

inconsistency, protected by legislation, perpetuates the wraparound
insurance shelter.
C. Savers' Annuities
122
From 1977 to 1979, the Service issued favorable letter rulings

119

Petrie, supra note 85, at 103 (describing marketiftg of products designed "to

produce the same effects as the investment annuity"); see Goldberg & Lemke, supra
note 28, at 444 (describing the popularity of these annuity types during the late
1970s); Vinyard, supra note 34, at 1768 (describing these types of annuities as having
been "developed in the latter part of the 1970s to avoid problems encountered by
investment annuities with the IRS").
120 The primary seller of the investment annuity, First Investment Annuity Inc.,
was unable to recover from the effects of Revenue Ruling 77-85. See Investment
Annuity Says Holder ClearPlan for Firm's Liquidation, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1978, at
28 (describing liquidation plans of Investment Annuity, Inc.); IRS Ends Deferral
Granted Investment Annuity Contracts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1977, at 3 (describing
suspension of investment annuity sales following issuance of Rev. Rul. 77-85).
1
Indeed, the financial press today describes even the blandest of variable
contracts as mutual funds wrapped in insurance. See, e.g., Jonathan Clements,
Defending a Much-Maligned Investment: When Variable Annuities Make Sense, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 20, 2004, at D1 ("Variable annuities which allow you to buy mutual funds
inside a tax-deferred wrapper .. "); Ian McDonald, Mutual-Fund Scrutiny Spreads to
Annuities - Regulators See the Fingerprintsof Market Timers in the Accounts Often
Held by Cautious Investors, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7, 2003, at C1 ("Variable annuities are
essentially tax-deferred mutual-fund accounts with an insurance wrapper.").
122 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-48-012 (Aug. 30, 1977); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-49-013
(Sept. 6, 1978); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-03-101 (Oct. 23, 1978); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
79-06-058 (Nov. 9, 1978); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-51-114 (Sept. 21, 1979); see Vinyard,
supra note 34, at 1770 & n.17 (describing some of these letter rulings).
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for "savers'

annuities, '' 123

which were structurally

similar

to

investment annuities. 12 Under the savers' annuity, a savings and loan
association (S&L) contracted with an insurance company to act as the
"group contract-holder under an annuity plan.' ' 125 The insurance
company then marketed the savers' annuity to the existing depositors
at the S&L. These depositors would transfer cash, an existing
passbook account, or a CD to the insurance company in exchange for
the annuity contract. 126 The insurance company transferred these
premium funds (minus a fee for itself) to the S&L, which invested
them in a federally insured CD 127 with a term designated by the
contract holder.
As with the investment annuity, the contract
holder did "not have direct access to the interest earned on the
deposit in the S&L except as the terms of the Annuity Plan allow him
payments of benefits, loans on the cash value of the policy, or

surrender of the policy for its cash value less a cash surrender
charge. 12 1 Some contract plans allowed contract holders to
withdraw
S
130
as much as 4% of principal per year without a penalty charge.

123
124

See Calhoun, supra note 23, at 774-75 (describing these annuities).
See Vinyard, supra note 34, at 1765-66 (describing the savers' annuities

and
the favorable Service letter rulings).
125Rev. Rul. 80-274, 1980-2 C.B.
27.
126 See id.; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-48-012 (Aug.
30, 1977); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
78-49-013 (Sept. 6, 1978); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-03-101 (Oct. 23, 1978); I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 79-06-058 (Nov. 9, 1978).
127See Calhoun, supra note 23, at 776 ("Many analysts
believed that the key
factor in Revenue Ruling 80-274 was each policyholder's entitlement to $100,000 of
FSLIC insurance."); Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-38 (describing the savers' annuity);
Donald Moffitt, Being Both a Borrower and a Lender Can Pay; New Plan Offers Tax
Deferral on Bank Savings, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1979, at 48 (describing federal
insurance for savers' annuities).
128 Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 144, discussed infra Part
III.D, highlighted this
fact: "Similarly, Rev. Rul. 80-274... holds that the purchaser of an annuity contract,
by means of which the purchaser selected and controlled specified certificates of
deposit . . . is considered the owner of the certificates ....
" (emphasis added).
When a particular CD expired, the proceeds would be reinvested in a CD of the
same duration as the original. If the term on the CD extended beyond the start date
of the annuity payments, then the funds were invested in a passbook savings account
instead. Rev. Rul. 80-274, 1980-2 C.B. 27.
129 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-48-012 (Aug.
30, 1977).
130 See Moffitt, supra note 127, at 48 (describing such a provision
and stating,
"[o]therwise, withdrawals are subject to charges that start at 7% in the first year and
fall by one percentage point a year to the eighth year...."). Loans taken against
annuity cash value were not taxed at this point in time. See supra Part II.A.
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Savers' annuities had a limited but significant following"' - a
following perhaps due more to marketing efforts than to the actual
value of these products as investments. The yield on the plans, after
taking into account Stax132on withdrawals, was somewhat less than that

on tax-exempt bonds.
The plans were available for premium
payments
as low as $1,000 and were within reach of less affluent
•133
investors. When the Service moved against these plans, as described
below, insurance company representatives speculated that the Service

was attempting to cut off the tax benefits before they became too
widely available.
In December of 1979, the Service took a first tentative step in
reconsidering its policyI- on
135 savers' annuities when it withdrew prior
favorable private rulings.
The reason given by the Service for the
withdrawals was based on a technical problem with the original letter
ruling requests. 136 The insurance companies were quickly able to
131

Jill Bettner, IRS Draws a Bead on 'WraparoundAnnuities,' Threatens Popular

Tax-DeferralSavings Plans, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1980, at 56 (reporting on estimates of
the involvement of at least 500 S&Ls); see also Moffitt, supra note 127, at 48
(describing one bank that received nearly $1 million in investments in one year).
132See Moffitt, supra note 127, at 48 (describing plan offering yields
between 7
percent and 8 percent).
...See Bettner, supra note 131, at 56 ("Some saver annuities have minimums of
as little as $1,000. The minimum initial deposit for mutual-fund annuities ranges from
$1,500 to $3,000."); Moffitt, supra note 127, at 48 (describing the availability of a
"$1,000 certificate with a net annual yield of 7.17%").
134Bettner, supra note 131, at 56 (quoting one representative who said,
"[w]ith
relatively small companies ...can you imagine what would happen if the big boys got
in? ... The IRS wasn't getting a piece of the action.") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
135 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-08-185 (Dec. 3, 1979) (withdrawing
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 79-06-058); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-08-210 (Dec. 3,1979) (withdrawing I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-03-101); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-08-215 (Dec. 3, 1979) (withdrawing
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-49-013); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-09-042 (Dec. 4, 1979)
(withdrawing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-48-012).
136 The insurance companies had represented in their ruling requests that they
were the titled owners of the underlying investment assets. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
77-48-012 (Aug. 30, 1977) (stating that the insurance company would hold legal title
to the segregated asset accounts). However, the passbook for each account stated
"[t]he insurance company holds this account as agent for annuitant.... ." Id.
(emphasis added). The Service's withdrawals were based on a revenue procedure
providing that the Service would not rule on tax ownership issues unless the person
making the request was the formal owner. Because the agency language in the
passbooks was inconsistent with formal ownership of the underlying annuity
investments being with the insurance companies, the Service stated it was required to
withdraw the rulings. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-08-215 (Dec. 3, 1979); I.R.S. Priv.
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resolve the technical concern. For example, one insurance company137
submitted new factual information on December 14, 1979,138 and on
January 15, 1980, the Service issued a new private ruling holding that
the insurance company and not the annuitant would be treated as the
owner of the underlying CDs. 131 Just a few months later, however, the
Service took a public position against the savers' annuity by issuing
Revenue Ruling 80-274,140 the second of the "investor control"
141
rulings.

Ltr. Rul. 80-08-185 (Dec. 3, 1979); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-08-210 (Dec. 3, 1979);
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-09-042 (Dec. 4, 1979).
137 The prior rulings issued to the taxpayer
were I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 77-48-012
(Aug. 30, 1977) and I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-09-042 (Dec. 4, 1979).
138 The company
stipulated, "[t]he taxpayer will have all the incidents of
ownership of the deposits, and the deposits will be held in the taxpayer's own name,
and not as an agent for the annuitant." I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-15-065 (Jan. 15, 1980);
see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-24-092 (Mar. 24, 1980) (representing that the
"deposits will be segregated accounts for which the insurance company will hold the
title and passbooks"); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-11-046 (Dec. 19, 1979) (representing
that "[t]he Company will hold the passbooks or other indications of ownership in its
own name").
139 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-15-065 (Jan. 15, 1980).
140 Rev. Rul. 80-274, 1980-2
C.B. 27; see Calhoun, supra note 23, at 776
(describing Revenue Ruling 80-274); see also Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-38 (same);
Scheibla, supra note 35, at 26 (same).
Revenue Ruling 80-274 "did not provide for an automatic grandfathering of
existing contracts ....
Rather, companies that previously had received favorable
private rulings on their savers' annuities were granted section 7805(b) relief only on a
case-by-case basis." Calhoun, supra note 23, at 775. Such relief was granted to
several of the taxpayers receiving such favorable letter rulings. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
81-08-113 (Nov. 28, 1980) (providing retroactive relief to recipient of I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Ruls. 78-49-013 and 80-08-215); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-08-128 (Nov. 28, 1980)
(providing relief to recipient of I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 77-48-012 and 80-09-042); I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-08-137 (Nov. 28, 1980) (providing relief to recipient of I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Ruls. 79-06-058 and 80-08-815).
141 Some insurance companies tried to continue on with
the savers' annuity by
making slight adjustments designed to circumvent the direct terms of Revenue Ruling
80-274. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-32-118 (May 18, 1981). For example, one insurance
company "reserve[d] the right to require the substitution of investment instruments
held in the Contract owner's individual account." Id. The company would exercise
this right "when in its opinion an investment instrument [was] no longer appropriate
for the purposes of the Contract or for its administrative procedures." Id. The
Service did not waver again as to its approach to this savers' annuity structure:
Although the Contract owner has not chosen the term of the investment
instruments which must be purchased for the life of his contract, as he does
in Rev. Rul. 80-274, the Contract owner has knowledge of and does consent
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This ruling held that the contract holders should be deemed to
own directly the underlying CDs wrapped in the savers' annuities.

The ruling explained that "the policyholder's position is substantially
identical to what the policyholder's position would have been had the
investment been directly maintained or established with the savings
and loan association ....[The life insurance company] is little more

than a conduit between the policyholder and the savings and loan
association., 142 The ruling cited only Revenue Ruling 77-85 in support
143
of its conclusion, yet compared to the holder of an investment

annuity, the savers' annuity contract holder had little choice as to the
type of investments and only received a fixed rate of return tied to a

low-risk instrument"

Indeed, the underlying CDs were even

federally insured. The savers' annuity was similar to the investment
annuity only in that the policyholders and insurance companies made
use of third-party custodial arrangements and the underlying

investments were CDs available outside the savers' annuity. Thus,
Revenue Ruling 80-274's emphasis on the contract holder's position
being "substantially identical" to that of an ordinary S&L presaged
the bright-line prohibition against publicly available investments,

to the Company's investment of his funds in whatever instrument has the
highest yield at the time funds are available for reinvestment .... The
Contract owner is not in a substantially different position from the position
he or she would be in had he or she invested a sum of money in a financial
institution using the Company as an investment advisor.
Id. For similar negative rulings on annuities similar to savers' annuities, see I.R.S.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-32-104 (May 15, 1981); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-46-066 (Aug. 21,
1981); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-46-067 (Aug. 21, 1981); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-47-197
(Aug. 31, 1981).
As occurred following the issuance of Revenue Ruling 77-85, legislation was
proposed to overturn Revenue Ruling 80-274. This was opposed by the Treasury on
the basis "that the legislative history of the 1959 and 1962 insurance company tax laws
indicated that Congress contemplated tax-deferred treatment only for variable
annuity contracts that involved a commingled investment fund managed by the life
insurance company.., and that wrap-around annuities did not fit that description."
Goldberg & Lemke, supra note 27, at 449-50 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also Jill Bettner, Wraparound Annuities Could Be Hurt by Expected IRS Ruling on
Ownership, WALL ST.J., Sept. 17, 1981, at 4 (describing lobbying efforts by insurance
industry); Scheibla, supra note 35, at 11 (describing bills introduced to reverse the
rulings on investment annuities and savers' annuities).
142 Rev. Rul. 80-274, 1980-2 C.B. 27.
141See Scheibla, supra note 35, at 26 (arguing that the "IRS failed to provide
a
legal basis for its action").
'44 Calhoun, supra note 23, at 775-76.
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which was adopted in 1981.145
D. Mutual Fund Annuities
Mutual fund annuities developed contemporaneously with savers'
annuities.146 Their structure was similar except that the underlying
account investments were publicly available mutual funds instead of
CDs.
Like savers' annuities, mutual fund annuities were also
affordable for less affluent taxpayers.1 47 After the issuance of
Revenue Ruling 80-274, insurance companies continued marketing
annuities wrapped around mutual funds, 48 even though the Treasury

145 See Petrie, supra note 85, at 104 (stating that Revenue Ruling
80-274 "stand[s]

for the proposition that annuity treatment will not be accorded to transactions which
are designed primarily to shield investments from current income taxation"); see also
Alexander, supra note 88 (discussing "substantially identical" requirement).
146 See William G. Flanagan, Creative Brokers Make Annuities a
New Means of
Using Your Mutual Fund as Tax Shelter, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1980, at 34 (praising the
"imagination" of "the peddlers of mutual funds," who with the "aid of the insurance
industry," were "pushing a product that gives investors tax-deferred dividends on
their mutual fund investments"); Thomas C. Hayes, Your Money; Annuity Funds and
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1981, at 30 (stating that the first annuity of this type "was
introduced.., in February 1979"); Scheibla, supra note 35, at 11 (stating that mutual
fund annuities "were launched three years ago").
Mutual fund annuities may have been introduced less as a tax ploy and more as a
way for mutual funds to stay competitive with insurance. See Thomas, supra note 43,
at 17-18 (describing intention of some mutual fund companies of going into field of
variable annuities).
147 Jill Bettner, New IRS Probe Into 'WraparoundAnnuities' Isn't
Likely to Stall
the Tax-Deferral Plans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 1981, at 56 ("Minimum initial deposits
are small, ranging from $1,500 to $3,000.").
148 See Bettner, supra note 141, at 4 ("Well over half a billion
dollars' worth of
the annuities have been sold since the plans became available in 1979 .... "); Thomas
C. Hayes, Annuity Tax Rule Changed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1981, at 36 ("It was the
lure of deferring taxes.., that, in part, attracted more than $1 billion into the socalled wraparound annuities in the last three years."); Hayes, supra note 146, at 30
("[M]ore than $1 billion has flowed into the five biggest funds since... February
1979.").
Uncertainty over the outcome of the 1980 presidential election (Carter-Reagan)
may also have contributed to the continued sales. See Bettner, supra note 131, at 56
("[A] Treasury Department spokesman ... adds ... that with the November election
just around the corner: 'It doesn't make sense to create another firestorm right now'
[by issuing another ruling]."). The Reagan administration, however, continued the
Carter administration's policy towards wrap-around insurance. Scheibla, supra note
35, at 11 (describing issuer expectation that Reagan administration "would reverse, or
at least call a halt to, the attack on annuities").
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broadly hinted that the savers' annuity ruling would be extended, 9
press articles speculated about the imminent demise of mutual fund
annuities,"O and the SEC required the issuers of mutual fund annuities
to disclose the possibility of an adverse Service ruling. 51
That adverse ruling, Revenue Ruling 81-225, was issued in a news
112
release dated September 25, 1981.
This ruling described several
factual situations in which the contract holder would be deemed to be
the owner of the underlying contract investments. For example, in the
149

See Vinyard, supra note 34, at 1770 (describing statement by Service

Commissioner on ease of expanding the ruling to cover mutual fund annuities);
Bettner, supra note 131, at 56 (describing Treasury statement that the Service was
considering extending ruling to mutual fund annuities).
"0 See Goldberg & Lemke, supra note 28, at 434 (describing financial press
reports that "presaged the Service's intentions in this area"); Bettner, supra note 131,
at 56 (discussing "the potential for an IRS attack on annuities wrapped around mutual
funds").
Business Week initially reported that Revenue Ruling 80-274 extended to
mutual fund annuities on its face, Tax Briefs, Bus. WK., Nov. 24, 1980, at 83, but about
six weeks later a retraction was issued in connection with a "Readers Report"
submitted by a vice president of a financial services corporation. Arnold D. Scott,
Readers Report, BUS. WK., Jan. 12, 1981, at 7 (stating that his company was "happy to
say that the coup de grdce has not been administered" to mutual fund annuities by the
new ruling). This report was accompanied by an editor's note: "Business Week erred
in extending the rationale of Revenue Ruling 80-274 to include mutual fund
wraparound annuities." Id.
5' See Goldberg & Lemke, supra note 28, at 449 (describing SEC requirement of
disclosing risk of an adverse tax ruling on mutual fund annuities); Vinyard, supra note
34, at 1770 (same); Scheibla, supra note 35, at 11 (describing advertisement including
"small print" disclosure about Rev. Rul. 80-274).
152 Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 12 n.1; see Calhoun, supra note
23, at 777
(describing press release).
Revenue Ruling 81-225 was originally made retroactive to January 1, 1981. Rev.
Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 12. There was a limited exception for certain qualified group
plans. See Calhoun, supra note 23, at 777 (describing the retroactivity provisions of
Rev. Rul. 81-225). The investor control doctrine was determined not to apply to these
qualified plans in Rev. Proc. 99-44, 1999-2 C.B. 598.
Congress was petitioned to overturn the retroactivity of the ruling. See Clyde H.
Farnsworth, Washington Watch: Reliability of U.S. Data,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1981, at
D2 (describing the industry efforts against retroactivity); Bill Frenzel, Frenzel on
'Wrap-around'Annuities, 14 TAX NoTEs 40, 40 (Jan. 4, 1982) (statement by Ways and
Means Committee Member calling retroactivity "unconscionable"). The Service
responded to the "problems encountered by issuers of wraparound annuities
attempting to comply" by affording an additional year's relief for "capital gains
dividends and unrealized appreciation." IRS News: Relief Issued for Wraparound
Annuity Reporting, 14 TAX NOTES 440, 440 (Feb. 15, 1982); see Calhoun, supra note
23, at 778 (describing the announcement for some relief from retroactivity).
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first situation, contract premiums could be allocated solely to a
publicly available mutual fund. Taxpayers who already owned shares
in the mutual fund were allowed to exchange their shares for a

variable annuity contract tied to the same mutual fund "without
payment of any fee, sales charge or transfer charge. 1 53 The Service4
held that the contract holder was the tax owner of this mutual fund 1

because the contract holder exercised "investment control over the
mutual fund shares and possesse[d] sufficient other incidents of
ownership to be considered the owner of the mutual fund shares for
' The ruling reasoned that the contract
federal income tax purposes."155

holder's position was "substantially identical to what his or her
position would have been had the mutual fund shares been purchased
directly (or indirectly ...).,,16
Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 12.
The Service held that the contract holder was the deemed owner of the
underlying contract assets in three other situations. Id. Situation Three was identical
to Situation One except that the policyholders were able to allocate premiums to five
different publicly available mutual funds instead of to just one. Id. In both Situations
One and Three, the mutual funds were managed by a firm unaffiliated with the
insurance company. Id. In Situation Two, otherwise identical to Situation One, the
insurance company (or one of its affiliates) managed the publicly available mutual
fund. Id. Situation Four was identical to Situation Two except that the shares in the
mutual fund were available only through the purchase of an annuity contract or by
participation in an investment plan account, which was an account created by
insurance companies in which customers could invest without the purchase of a
variable insurance product. Id.
An "investment plan account" was a financial security program set up by a life
insurance company for customers who wanted to "obtain advantages commonly
associated with mutual funds and retain benefits of the life insurance company's
investment management skills." Rev. Rul. 70-525, 1970-2 C.B. 144. The fact that this
type of "public" ownership would cause a contract to fail the investor control test is
somewhat startling since the investment plan accounts were accounts wholly under
the control of the insurance companies, and according to Revenue Ruling 70-525, the
investment plan account constituted a "segregated asset account under the insurance
laws or regulations of the state." Id. However, since purchase of shares in these
accounts was available without purchase of a variable contract, this revenue ruling
foreclosed the ability of insurance companies to get around the prohibition on public
ownership by simply becoming the issuers of mutual fund interests themselves.
155 Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 12.
156 After revisions to the Code were enacted
in the early 1980s, described infra
Part III.E, insurance companies argued that the policyholders' position could no
longer be "substantially identical to what it would have been had the mutual fund
shares been purchased directly by the policyholders" because the Code restricted the
policyholders in several new ways. Rev. Rul. 82-54, 1982-1 C.B. 11; see also infra
notes 212-24 and accompanying text (discussing I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001
(May 2, 2002)).
153
154
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The ruling gave only one example of a situation in which the
contract holder would not be deemed the owner of the underlying

contract assets. In that example, the facts were the same as those in
the first situation except that the mutual fund was available for
purchase only through an annuity contract. About this situation, the
ruling stated:
[T]he shares of XY Fund, [the mutual fund], are not separate

investments assets; XY Fund is nothing more than the alter
ego of IC, [the insurance company] ....

This situation is

equivalent for federal income tax purposes to the direct
purchase by IC of the underlying portfolio of assets of XY
Fund. IC possesses sufficient incidents of ownership to be
considered the owner of these underlying assets for federal

income tax purposes.118
These statements created the bright-line prohibition on the allocation
of premiums or cash value directly to investments also available for
purchase outside of the variable insurance. 9
Revenue Ruling 81-225 was amplified a short time later in
There was one difference: in Situation Five, the mutual fund was managed by
the insurance company (or one of its affiliates). Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 12.
Following the issuance of this ruling, there was also speculation that the ruling created
a prohibition against hiring outside managers. Hayes, supra note 148, at 36 (reporting
on speculation that mutual funds might be able to stay in the annuity business by
starting restricted funds "and having the insurance company that was their partner be
the advisor"). The use of outside investment advisers is now clearly permissible
under the Code. I.R.C. § 817(h)(5).
158 Rev. Rul. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 12.
159 See Alexander, supra note 88 ("Under Rev. Rul. 81-225, then, 'public
availability' is the key determinant of whether the policyholder possesses sufficient
incidents of ownership to be considered the owner of the underlying investments for
tax purposes."); Calhoun, supra note 23, at 777 (describing "implicit rationale" of
bright-line rule as being "based on the theory that since the policyholder could
acquire the [publicly available] mutual fund shares directly.., the indirect acquisition
of shares through a variable annuity should not allow the policyholder to escape from
taxation on this income and gain"); Goldberg & Lemke, supra note 28, at 445
(describing Rev. Rul. 81-225 as providing that "[t]he contractowner [sic] was deemed
to have investment control if the fund's shares were available for purchase.., by
members of the general public"); Petrie, supra note 85, at 704 ("The only situation
expressly escaping the Service's attack involved a single mutual fund managed by the
insurance company that was not available to the general public."); Stecker et al.,
supra note 83 ("[I]nsurance companies had... to conform to the Service's position on
investor control by replacing publicly available mutual funds as investment options
with mutual funds available only to other separate accounts.").
157
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Revenue Ruling 82-54, which held that an insurance company could
allow policyholders to choose between three different funds, so long
as these funds were not available for purchase by the public. 160 Each

of the three mutual funds had a different general investment strategy:
one invested in common stocks, another in bonds, and a third in
money market investments. The ruling held that "the ability to
choose among broad, general investment strategies such as stocks,
bonds or money market instruments ...does not constitute sufficient
control over individual investment decisions so as to cause ownership
of the private mutual fund shares to be attributable to the
policyholders.' 16 This ruling thus solidified the bright-line test under
which policyholders would be taxed as owners if they could allocate

premium to an investment that was publicly available.
Revenue Ruling 82-54 may provide some content to the general,

substance-over-form investor control test. In particular, the tax
agencies have discussed issuing rulings regarding the number of
available underlying funds. 16 The concern is that the tax-preferred
investment not appear too similar to a taxable investment. That is,
the variable contract should not be merely a conduit (which could
arise if there were too few fund choices or if the investment strategy
was too narrow) and the investors should not have the same range of
investment choices inside the contract as they would outside the6
contract (which could arise if there were too many fund choices).1 1
Revenue Ruling 82-54 could be viewed as providing that such
160

Rev. Rul. 82-54, 1982-1 C.B. 11.

The Service also issued Rev. Rul. 82-55,

1982-1 C.B. 12, which addressed whether a mutual fund could "be closed to further
purchase by the public and thus be treated . .. as owned by the insurance company"
and the "effect of post-1980 withdrawals and dividend reinvestment."
161 Rev. Rul. 82-54, 1982-1 C.B. 11.
162 Alexander, supra note 88 (describing Service's suggestions for "additional
restrictions on policyholder control" as likely "focus[ing] on the number of
investment choices available to the policyholder and on the frequency with which the
policyholder could change his or her choices").
163See Thompson, supra note 20, at 508-20 (discussing problems related
to
number of underlying investments).
Other tax-advantaged retirement vehicles,
including IRAs and 401(k)s, also provide a number of different investment options,
and many nonqualifed deferred compensation arrangements offer a broad array of
choices. See id. at 525 n.279. Yet, investor control has not been raised in either of
these areas. Id. The Senate recently proposed limits on investment choice in
nonqualifed deferred compensation, but this proposal was not enacted. See SenatePassed Version of S. 1637, The Jumpstart Our Business Strength Act, TAX NOTES
TODAY (May 20, 2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2004 TNT 98-9).
The facts in a recent ruling similar to Revenue Ruling 82-54 allowed for up to
twenty fund choices. See infra note 234.
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concerns are alleviated if contract holders are permitted to allocate
premiums only to broad investment strategy funds. The problem,
however, was that it provided little guidance as to what constituted a
broad investment strategy and no guidance on whether the number of
funds in the ruling - three - was important to the holding.
The bright-line rule created in Revenue Ruling 81-225 drew
criticism from the insurance industry.' 64 Yet, in the week before the

164

Revenue Ruling 81-225 was also the subject of litigation brought by the

Christoffersens, who had paid $50,000 for a Pacific Variable Annuity Contract from
Pacific Fidelity Life Insurance Company. Christoffersen v. United States, 749 F.2d
513, 514 (8th Cir. 1984). Arthur Christoffersen was an official of the parent of Pacific
Fidelity. See Scott R. Schmedel, A Special Summary and Forecastof Federaland State
Tax Developments, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1984, at 14. This contract gave the
Christoffersens the "right" to purchase an annuity in the year 2021. Christoffersen,
749 F.2d at 514. In the meantime, the $50,000 was invested "at plaintiffs' direction, in
the Fidelity Daily Income Trust." Id. There was no obligation to ever actually
purchase an annuity contract. In addition, the Christoffersens could select "which of
the mutual funds offered by Pacific Fidelity to invest in and [could] change to another
fund at any time." Id. at 515. The investors could also "withdraw any or all of his
investment upon seven days notice." Id.
The Christoffersens paid tax on the income generated by this trust then filed a
claim for refund in federal district court. The district court summarily held in favor of
the Christoffersens. The district court wrote only: "The contract is an annuity...
qualifying for deferred taxation under 26 U.S.C. § 72." Christoffersen v. United
States, 578 F. Supp. 398, 399 (N.D. Iowa) (citing Inv. Annuity, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 422
F. Supp. 681, 689 (D.D.C. 1977)), rev'd, Christoffersen v. United States, 749 F.2d 513
(1984). The district court's opinion was viewed as a victory by the insurance industry.
See Schmedel, supra, at 14 (describing reactions).
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court, explaining, "[t]he only difference
between Pacific Fidelity's arrangement and that of a traditional brokerage firm is the
fact that the investor is limited to withdrawing cash." Christoffersen, 749 F.2d at 515.
The court, quoting the Supreme Court, explained: "We cannot too often reiterate that
taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual
command over the property taxed - the actual benefit for which the tax is paid." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). Of the investor control revenue rulings, the court
cited only to Revenue Ruling 81-225 and mistakenly viewed it as dealing with the
doctrine of constructive receipt rather than tax ownership through control: "Under
the long recognized doctrine of constructive receipt, the income generated by the
account assets should be taxed to the plaintiffs in the year earned, not at some later
time when the Christoffersens choose to receive it. This is the essence of Rev. Rul.
81-225, which we find persuasive." Id. at 516. The court did not focus at all on the
unique aspect of the revenue ruling: whether the public availability of underlying
contract assets should be sufficient to trigger constructive ownership. Thus,
Christoffersen cannot be read as an endorsement of that particular aspect of the
investor control doctrine. See Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-39 n.91 (describing
Christoffersen).
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ruling was issued, one insurance insider boasted that after the ruling
was released, "[e]verybody will be back in business within 48
hours .... There's nothing short of changing the law we can't get
around, and Congress has refused to do that before. 1 65 Similarly,
before the ruling was issued, one attorney explained that "[i]f the
ruling.., knocks out mutual-fund annuities on the 'public access'
question, [a]ll the company has to do is clone a fund that isn't
available to the general public.
,,166
This attorney further predicted
"that any IRS attack on the annuities will amount to nothing more
than guaranteed employment for lawyers like me.' ' 167 Similarly, just
one day following the issuance of Revenue Ruling 81-225, the New
York Times reported on two methods that insurance companies could
explore to avoid the ruling: First, the insurance companies could
create and manage their own funds, 168 and
second, they could use
6
1
clones of publicly available mutual funds.
The rationale for the prohibition on public investments was to
keep variable insurance products from seeming too investment
oriented. This prohibition did not, however, affect variable contracts
with a strong investment flavor so long as the new sourcing rule
created by Revenue Ruling 81-225 was observed. The tax agencies
recognized that the investor control rulings left open the possibility of
cloned funds."7 While it would have been possible to issue another
revenue ruling extending the prohibition to investments that were too
similar to publicly available funds, the Service determined that this
would not be feasible."' Instead, the Service began to impose
diversification requirements on account funds by requiring certain
representations in order to receive a favorable private letter ruling on
the investor control issue." The Service tried out several different
165

Bettner, supra note 147, at 56 (internal quotation marks omitted).

166Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
167

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

168Hayes, supra note 148, at 36 ("[I]nsurance companies have the option
of

creating their own mutual funds and managing them independently.").
169 Id. (describing idea of introducing clones); see also Petrie, supra note 85,
at
113-14 (discussing ways in which insurance companies could avoid the ruling); Jill
Bettner, IRS Attacks Popular 'Wraparound Annuities,' But Companies Ready New
Tax-Deferral Plans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1981, at 56 (discussing the possibility of
using clones to bypass the new revenue ruling).
170 See Calhoun, supra note 23, at 779-80 (describing tax agencies' concern
about
clone funds).
171 See id. at 779 (describing Service's realization that
"it could not police
differences among mutual funds").
172 The required representations were outlined in a private ruling. I.R.S. Priv.
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diversification rules with no apparent rationale guiding a particular
diversification mix,"' although the overarching reason behind the new

requirement was the belief that diversification would render it more
difficult to use variable insurance contracts as a substitute for publicly
available investments." In 1984, Congress codified a diversification
standard'75 and also provided Treasury with the authority to

promulgate additional tests.
E. Legislative Responses
Following the rise of the wraparound insurance

products,

Congress determined to curtail privileges for contracts that were too
investment oriented. The legislation enacted during the early 1980s
was aimed at both fixed and variable life insurance and annuity

contracts. The specific reforms to life insurance and annuities took
place in the shadow of the larger reform effort undertaken in 1986.
This reform effort shut down many tax shelters. At the same time, the
life insurance and annuity reforms did not end the tax deferral
afforded to inside buildup. 7 6 The combined effect of the overall
reform and the new legislative certainty may actually have driven

more

investors into variable contracts,

including wraparound

Ltr. Rul. 83-35-124 (May 27, 1983); see Service Notes Proceduresfor ObtainingRuling
on Wraparound Annuities, 20 TAX NoTEs 770, 797 (Sept. 5, 1983) (describing the
private ruling); see also Calhoun, supra note 23, at 779-80 (discussing diversification
requirements imposed through letter rulings); Michael R. Levy & Andrew H.
Friedman, InsuranceCompanies Oppose Prohibitionon Use of Government Securities
to Fund Variable Annuity or Life Contracts, TAX NOTEs TODAY (Nov. 28, 1986)
(LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 86 TNT 236-40) (same); Skillman, supra
note 1, at 40-40 (same).
173 See also Calhoun, supra note 23, at 780 ("[T]he definition
of what constituted
diversification changed several times over this period."); Skillman, supra note 1, at 4040 (describing lack of clarity surrounding Service's rationale for the diversification
requirements).
174 See Kenneth M. Kess, Wrap-Around Annuities Maintain
Tax Deferral
Through Diversification, 13 J. TAX'N INv. 3, 6 (1995) (stating that the diversification
requirement was imposed "to discourage the use of variable annuities and life
insurance primarily as tax-motivated investment vehicles"); Levy & Friedman, supra
note 172 (explaining that diversification helped ensure that it would be more difficult
to duplicate direct investments).
175 Diversification was codified at the urging of Treasury
and the Service. See
Calhoun, supra note 23, at 781 (describing tax agencies' decision to seek codification
of diversification).
176 See Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-42 ("Congress has undertaken
... to confine
life insurance and annuity contracts more or less to their traditional niches in the
investment market.").
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contracts tied to insurance-only funds or clones of publicly available
funds.'7 7
1. Life Insurance Changes
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 added a definition of "life
insurance" to the Code. 11 The definition, still in effect, requires a
177

For example, a training manual for insurance sellers stated:

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 effectively eliminated a number of tax
shelters. Especially men and women in the higher income ranges have been
left with few positive alternatives. However, life insurance was left virtually
untouched by Tax Reform. Almost overnight, financial experts, many who
had little to say about life insurance before, began to recognize its tax
benefits.
VARIABLE UNIVERSAL LIFE 42 (Egnar Jensen ed., 1988); see also Ellen E. Schultz,
Investors are Flocking to Fund Cousins: Variable Annuities, WALL ST. J., Jan, 7, 1994,
at R11 (the title speaks for itself); Michael Siconolfi, Tax Changes Spur InsuranceLinked Funds, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 1988, at 43 ("[M]utual fund assets in insurance
products have grown fivefold in recent years ...");Karen Slater, Life Insurance's
Appeal is Mixed Blessing; Firms Fear Tax Boon May Spur Washington Ire, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 8, 1986, at 6 (explaining that as a result of 1986 tax law reform, investors "are
turning to life insurance, that dreary old financial necessity, as an attractive
investment"); Karen Slater, Variable Annuities, Life Insurance: Tax-Favored Investing
- At a Price, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 1986, at 29 (explaining that if the then-proposed
legislation was passed, variable contracts could "become one of the hottest products
in the financial-services industry over the next few years").
178 I.R.C. § 7702(a). There had been some movement by Congress
in this area
through the enactment in 1982 of temporary legislation, Code section 101(f). This
provision applied only to flexible premium life insurance (e.g., universal life), and it
imposed a test essentially identical to the guideline premium/cash value corridor test
described infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text. For more discussion on old
section 101(f), see Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-16 to 40-17; Thompson, supra note 39,
at 54-55.
Prior to the enactment of a statutory definition of life insurance, the principal
authority in this area was the Supreme Court case of Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S.
531 (1941). This case involved the question of whether proceeds from a life insurance
policy were required to be included in the gross estate of the decedent. Id. at 537. At
the time, there was a $40,000 exemption for life insurance benefits payable to the
estate. Id. at 538. The decedent, at the age of 80, had purchased both an annuity
contract and a life insurance policy from an insurance company. As a result, any
mortality risk taken on by the insurance company through the life insurance policy
was perfectly hedged by the annuity contract. The Supreme Court held that this
arrangement did not constitute insurance because insurance must involve "riskshifting and risk-distributing." Id. at 539. Many articles have been written about
LeGierse and the product purchased by the decedent in that case. See, e.g., David S.
Miller, DistinguishingRisk: The Disparate Tax Treatment of Insurance and Financial
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contract to meet one of two complex tests, or the contract will be
treated like a taxable investment account. 179 Both tests use actuarial
180
principles to control the ratio of cash value to death benefit.
Although these new definitional requirements did somewhat restrict
Contracts in a Converging Marketplace, 55 TAX LAW. 481, 504-33 (2002). For
accounts about the estate tax gambit at issue in LeGierse, see CLARK, supra note 22,
at 36-37; Charles F. Dugan, Note, Taxation - Insurance and Annuity Contracts
Under the Federal Estate Tax: Differentiation and Theories of Taxation, 38 MICH. L.
REV. 526 (1940); Bruce H. Greenfield, Note, Federal Taxation of Combined Annuity
and Life Insurance Contracts, 49 YALE L.J. 946 (1940); Note, Application of the
Federal Estate Tax to Life Insurance Policies, 32 ILL. L. REV. 223 (1937); Note,
Inheritance Taxes - Property Subject to Tax - What Is Insurance, 52 HARv. L. REV.
1180 (1939).
179 I.R.C. § 7702(g). Under this provision, the policyholder must treat as ordinary
income the amount by which the net increase in the surrender value plus the life
insurance costs exceeds the premiums paid during the year. I.R.C. § 7702(g)(1). All
prior years are also tainted, and the amount of any income from these prior years is
treated as being received or accrued during the year the contract fails the definitional
test. I.R.C § 7702(g)(1)(C). If the insured on a failed contract dies, the beneficiaries
will be able to exclude from income only the amount of the death benefit that exceeds
the net surrender value of the contract. I.R.C. § 7702(g)(2). If the failure to meet the
definitional test is due to "reasonable error" and is corrected, then the Secretary may
waive the failure. I.R.C. § 7702(f)(8).
180 The first test, known as the cash value
accumulation test, was designed to
allow traditional, level-premium cash value policies to qualify. See Skillman, supra
note 1, at 40-18 (explaining that the cash value accumulation test "is primarily aimed
at traditional whole life contracts"). In order to meet the cash value accumulation
test, the amount of the cash surrender value may not exceed the net single premium
that would be required to fund the future contract benefits. I.R.C. § 7702(b)(1).
Several additional technical requirements apply, including provisions relating to
interest rate assumptions and mortality charges. I.R.C. § 7702(b)(2). For a more
complete description of this test, see Pike, supra note 1, at 509-17.
The second test (which consists of two components, the guideline premium
requirement and the cash value corridor) was intended to allow newer, flexible
premium insurance products to qualify as life insurance. A contract will meet the
guideline premium requirement component of this second test if the amount of the
premiums paid does not exceed the greater of (1) the single premium that would be
necessary to fund the future benefits under the contract (the "guideline single
premium") or (2) the sum of the level premiums necessary to fund the future benefits
and which would have been paid at the time the contract is tested (the "guideline
level premiums"). I.R.C. § 7702(c). In addition to meeting the guideline premium
requirement, the contract must also fall within the cash value corridor specified in the
Code. I.R.C. § 7702(a)(2). This corridor specifies the minimum death benefit
required at different ages of the insured. I.R.C. § 7702(d)(2). This minimum death
benefit is defined as a percentage of the cash value available under the contract. Id.
Several highly technical additional requirements are imposed. For further discussion
of this second test, see Skillman, supra note 1, at 40-18 to -21.
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the investment orientation of life insurance products, the deferral on
inside buildup was essentially preserved. 181 Congress also allowed the

favorable treatment for life insurance distributions and loans to
182
continue.
That is, distributions from life insurance continue to be
treated as nontaxable returns of investments first, and any excess is
then taxed as ordinary income.
In addition, loans tied to the cash
surrender value are not treated as distributions.' 84
2. Changes to Annuity Code Provisions
In the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982

(TEFRA),

Congress

amended

the

rules

governing

annuity

distributions to reduce incentives for taxpayers to use these products

as short-term investments.185 First, distributions from annuities that
are not made as part of annuitization are now treated as coming first
out of investment in the contract. 186 Second, a ten percent penalty tax
181 See Pike, supra note 1, at 576 (explaining that the new legislation
was not a
"systematic overhaul" and the inside buildup continued to receive deferral); Skillman,
supra note 1, at 40-30 ("[T]he tax benefit of annuities consists almost entirely of
deferral.").
12 See supra
Part II.B.
183

I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(A).

184

I.R.C. § 72(e)(5)(C). In 1988, Congress changed these rules for life insurance

contracts with excessive front-loading of premiums. I.R.C. § 7702A(b).
Such
contracts allowed inside buildup to grow too large for Congress's taste. For these
contracts, called "modified endowment contracts" (MECs), the annuity distribution
and loan rules described infra Part III.E.2 apply instead. I.R.C. § 72(e)(10). In
addition, a 10 percent penalty tax is imposed on MEC distributions unless they are
made after the taxpayer has reached the age of 59 , the taxpayer has become
disabled, or it is part of a "series of substantially equal periodic payments" for the life
of the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 72(v). The creation of the MEC category was likely
triggered by the marketing of single-premium insurance as the last great tax shelter
after the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See Slater, Life Insurance's Appeal is Mixed
Blessing; Firms Fear Tax Boon May Spur Washington Ire, supra note 177, at 6
(explaining how insurance companies wished to downplay the role of single-premium
policies as "the last of the big tax shelters" for fear that Congress would curtail their
tax-preferred status).
185 See Goldberg & Lemke, supra note 28, at 450 (stating that
changes to taxation
of annuities "were designed to discourage the use of such annuities as short-term, taxsheltered investment vehicles").
186 I.R.C. § 72(e)(1)-(3).
However, no tax is imposed if the amount is kept as
premium by the insurance company. I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(B). Prior to TEFRA, the
treatment was more favorable: withdrawals that were not regular annuity payments
were taxed as though they came first from investment in the contract. See supra Part
II.A.
The Code distinguishes between distributions received as part of the
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applies to withdrawals made before the age of fifty-nine and onehalf. t1 7 Finally, contract loans, assignments, or pledges of the annuity
as collateral are to be treated as distributions.18

3. Diversification Requirements for Variable Contracts
In the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (DEFRA), Congress
codified a diversification requirement for the accounts underlying all
variable contracts, whether they are life insurance or annuity."' The

conference report relating to this enactment explained:
[T]he conference agreement allows any diversified fund to be
used as the basis of variable contracts so long as all shares of
the funds are owned by one or more segregated asset

accounts of insurance companies, but only if access to the
fund is available exclusively through the purchase of a

variable contract from an insurance company.
The fact that a similar fund is available to the public will not
cause the segregated asset fund to be treated as being publicly
available. In authorizing Treasury to prescribe diversification
standards, the conferees intend that the standards be

designed to deny annuity or life insurance treatment for
investments that are publicly available to investors and

investments which are made, in effect, at the direction of the
investor.19°
This passage rejects the notion that funds "similar" to publicly

annuitization and those "not received as annuities." I.R.C. § 72(e)(1)-(3). See supra
note 65.
187 I.R.C. § 72(q). The penalty tax was first set at 5 percent when enacted
in 1982,
but was raised to 10 percent in 1986. S. REP. No. 97-248, at 1085 (1983); H.R. REP.
No. 99-841, at 4541 (1987) (Conf. Rep.). In addition to the exception for distributions
made after the age of 59 , several other exceptions are available, including payments
made on disability of the taxpayer and death of the holder. I.R.C. § 72(q).
18
I.R.C. § 72(e)(4)(A).
189 I.R.C. § 817(h). If any of the accounts underlying
the variable contract fails to
meet the diversification requirement, the entire contract is treated as failing to be life
insurance for purposes of section 7702(a) or an annuity for purposes of section 72. Id.
Some relief is provided for inadvertent failures. See infra note 263.
190 H.R. REP. No. 98-861, at 1055 (1986). The Service and Treasury generally cut
the sentence referring to the availability of "similar fund" from their references to the
legislative history. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-92, 2003-2 C.B. 350.
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available funds are also suspect. With its emphasis on public
availability, this passage echoes the sourcing rule of investor control
and also perpetuates the limited reach of that rule.' 9'
The details of the diversification requirement are complex.' 92 The
diversification requirement applies at the level of the "segregated
asset account."' 93 Although initially there was some confusion about
the meaning of this term, regulations have established that it refers to
any underlying investment to which a contract holder may directly
allocate premium or cash value.'94 For example, if an individual
purchases a variable annuity and is able to move premiums among a
bond fund, equity fund, and fixed income fund, each of these funds
would be considered a segregated asset account and would have to
meet the diversification requirement.
Two safe harbors for meeting diversification have been created one statutory and the other regulatory. The statutory diversification
safe harbor 95 is derived from the diversification requirement imposed
by the Code on regulated investment companies (mutual funds). 196
191 See
192

infra Part IV.
For additional information about the diversification requirements, see

AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE COMPANIES, A Roadmap to the

Federal Income Taxation of Non-Qualified Annuity Contracts, 45 TAx LAW. 123
(1991).
193 The concept of "separate accounts" was added to the Code in
1962. See supra
notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
194 Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(e), (g) Examples 1 &
4 (1989); see also Stecker et al.,
supra note 6 (describing the development of the term "segregated asset account").
195 I.R.C. § 817(h)(2).
Under the statutory safe harbor, at least fifty percent of
the total assets in a segregated asset account must be represented by (1) cash, cash
items, government securities, and interests in other mutual funds; and (2) other
securities. I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A). As to the first group of items, an account may hold
no more than 55 percent of such assets. I.R.C. § 817(h)(2)(B). In addition, the
investment in "other securities" is limited. The account may not have more than 5
percent of the total value of its assets invested in the securities of any one issuer, and
the securities may not represent "more than 10 percent of the outstanding voting
securities" of any one issuer. I.R.C. § 851(b)(3)(A)(ii). There are also requirements
governing assets purchased outside of the "at least 50 percent" rules. First, the
account may not invest more than 25 percent of the value of its assets in the securities
of one issuer, unless that issuer is the government or another mutual fund. I.R.C.
§ 851(b)(3)(B)(i). Second, if the account owns securities in two or more issuers that
are engaged in similar trades or businesses, then no more than 25 percent of the value
of the account's assets may be invested in such issuer groups.
I.R.C.
§ 851(b)(3)(B)(ii). Control for purposes of this test requires only that 20 percent of
the ownership of the vote be owned by the account. I.R.C. § 851(c)(2).
196 Regulated investment companies (RICs) are governed
by Code sections 851
through 855. Mutual funds that qualify as RICs are taxed essentially as pass-through
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The regulatory safe harbor, finalized in March 1989,'9' requires that an
account must hold at least five investments in specified percentages.198

Key to understanding the relatively recent outbreak of hedge
fund wraparound contracts is a regulation allowing accounts investing
in certain pass-through entities to look-through to the assets held by
such entities in determining whether the regulatory diversification test
has been met.' 99 This look-through rule applies if all the beneficial
interests in a mutual fund, partnership, or trust' °° are owned only by

the accounts of insurance companies and if "[p]ublic access" to the
pass-through entity is available only through the purchase of a
variable contract. 2°1 There are, of course, exceptions to these
requirements,

one of which -

recently repealed -

spurred the

entities. See William Alfred Kern, Federal Income Taxation of Regulated Investment
Companies, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 29, 33-34 (1966) (describing diversification
requirements for RICs). For a more contemporary account of the tax treatment of
mutual funds, see Alan L. Kennard, The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX
LAW. 133 (2003).
197 T.D. 8242, 1989-1 C.B. 215.
Section 817(h) grants explicit authority to
Treasury to promulgate diversification standards.
198 Specifically, (1) "[n]o more than 55% of the value of the total assets of the
account [may be] represented by any one investment," (2) no more than 70% in any
two investments, (3) no more than 80% in any three investments, and (4) no more
than 90% in any four investments. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(b)(1)(i) (1989). For
purposes of this test, "[ajll securities of the same issuer, all interests in the same real
property project, and all interests in the same commodity are each treated as a single
investment." Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(b)(1)(ii)(A) (1989). In addition, each government
agency is treated as a separate issuer if government securities are purchased. I.R.C.
§ 817(h)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(b)(ii)(B) (1989).
199 I.R.C. § 817(h)(4); Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)
(1989).
200 Trusts treated as owned by the grantor under the Code only qualify for lookthrough treatment "if substantially all of the assets of the trust are represented by
Treasury securities." Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(2)(iii) (1989).
201 Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(2)(i)(B) (1989); see Sheppard, supra note 12 ("Most
insurers' segregated asset accounts attempt to satisfy the diversification rule ... by
virtue of the look-through rules .... ).
202 Four general exceptions apply. First, the general account of a life insurance
company may hold a beneficial interest so long as a segregated asset account in the
same insurance company also holds an interest in the entity, the return on the interest
is computed in the same way for both the general account and the segregated asset
account investor, and there is no intent to sell the interest in the pass-through entity
to the public. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(i) (1989). Second, a manager of the passthrough entity may hold a beneficial interest, but only if the interest was acquired "in
connection with the creation or management" of the pass-through entity, the return
on the interest is calculated the same for both the manager and the segregated asset
account investors, and there is no intent to sell the interest to the public. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.817-5(f)(3)(ii) (1989). Third, a beneficial interest may be "[h]eld by the trustee of
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growth of hedge fund wrappers. The regulations provided that
partnership interests qualified for look-through treatment if the
partnership was "not registered under a Federal or State law
regulating the offering or sale of securities, 203 even though some
interests were owned by non-insurance investors. Thus, contract
premiums could be allocated solely to a hedge fund structured as a
private placement partnership without failing diversification. 204
a qualified pension or retirement plan." Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(iii) (1989).
Finally, a beneficial interest may be held by members of the public, or those who are
treated as public policyholders under Rev. Rul. 81-225, if the investment entity was
closed to the public in accordance with Rev. Rul. 82-55 or if all the assets of the
segregated asset account are attributable to either premium payments made by
policyholders prior to Sept. 26, 1981, to premium payments made in connection with a
qualified pension or retirement plan, or to any combination of such premium
payments. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(3)(iv) (1989).
In response to recent Treasury requests for comments about these exceptions,
several practitioners have urged expanding these exceptions. In particular, numerous
commentators urged repealing the restriction requiring managers to hold only
interests yielding the same return as other interests in the investment entity. See infra
notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
203 Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(f)(2)(ii) (1989). As described infra
notes 235-37 and
accompanying text, this provision is excised from the proposed regulations issued on
July 30, 2003.
204 It is not clear the extent to which Treasury was
aware of the problem it was
creating. But see Hugh T. McCormick, Attorney Requests Additional Guidance on
Investments Held Under Variable Life Insurance Contracts, TAX NOTES TODAY n.5
(Feb. 26, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 38-25) (stating
"[ilt is thus difficult to construct a credible argument that the rule for non-registered
partnerships was not fully considered, or that it represents a 'loophole"'). This
exception for unregistered partnerships was apparently put in place at the insistence
of real estate groups:
This exception, installed in 1988 at the behest of a particular insurer, was
intended to permit investment in real estate limited partnerships whose
managers were being compensated over and above investment returns.
That is, it was intended as relief from the rule of reg. section 1.8175(f)(3)(ii), which restricts fund manager compensation to investment
returns computed on the same basis as they are for investors.
But reg. section 1.817-5(f)(2)(ii) is not restricted in any way; it just speaks
of partnerships that are not registered with federal or state securities
regulators. So planners have taken the bit in their teeth and run with it.
Sheppard, supra note 12. In response to recent Treasury requests for comments,
practitioners have particularly complained that the requirement that a managers'
interest be calculated the same for both manager and the segregated asset account
creates a situation in which it will be difficult to create all insurance private
investment partnerships. See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text. Given the
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As described in the next section, some companies argued that the
investor control rulings had been superseded by this regulation even

though Treasury had noted in its preamble to the initial, temporary
diversification regulations that it intended to leave the "investor
control" question open. 205 In addition, Treasury and Service officials
repeated their opinion on the continued vitality of investor control
throughout the 1990s 2°6 but took no new action on investor control
until 2002, when it became apparent that taxpayers were using the

diversification regulations to justify the wrapping of private placement
hedge funds inside variable insurance interests.
F. Hedge Fund Wrappers

Hedge funds

had not yet attained full prominence when the

results of creating the original exception for private placement partnerships, the
regulations finalized March 1, 2005, did not change the pro rata requirement for
managers. See infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
205 The preamble provided as follows:
The temporary regulations in this document do not address any issues other
than the diversification standards .... In particular, they do not provide
guidance concerning the circumstances in which investor control of the
investments of a segregated asset account may cause the investor, rather
than the insurance company, to be treated as the owner of the assets in the
account.
For example, the temporary regulations provide that in
appropriate cases a segregated asset account may include multiple subaccounts, but do not specify the extent to which policyholders may direct
their investments to particular sub-accounts without being treated as
owners of the underlying assets. Guidance on this and other issues will be
provided in regulations or revenue rulings under section 817(d), relating to
the definition of variable contract.
T.D. 8101, 1986-2 C.B. 97 reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY (Sept. 15, 1986) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 86 TNT 184-31); see also AMERICAN BAR AsS'N,
supra note 192, at n.74 (describing the preamble to the proposed regulations).
206 In 1999, for example, the Service issued Rev. Proc. 99-44,
1999-2 C.B. 598,
which described the circumstances under which certain plan annuity contracts would
be treated as qualified, "notwithstanding that contract premiums are invested at the
direction of the contract holder in publicly available securities." See also Anthony
Calabrese, Attorney Comments on Proposed Regs on Annuity Contracts, Life
Insurance, TAX NOTES TODAY (Dec. 5, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2003 TNT 234-13) (discussing other private letter rulings signaling the tax
agency's intent to preserve investor control); Marlis L. Carson, IRS's HOOE Outlines
Recent Insurance Taxation Guidance, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 17, 1994) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 94 TNT 203-6) (describing a private letter ruling
that "reaffirmed the relevance of the investor control doctrine").
207 Hedge funds are usually organized as private investment partnerships.
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208

diversification regulations were adopted,
but by mid-1998 it was
estimated that "there were between 2,500 and 3,500 hedge funds
managing between $200 billion and $300 billion in capital, with
approximately $800 billion to $1 trillion in total assets., 2 9 The linkage
of variable contracts and hedge funds began in earnest in the late
1990s.210 In 2001, articles describing hedge fund insurance wrappers
began appearing in both specialized tax publications and mainstream
211
news outlets.
In a letter ruling made available to the public in

Generally, they invest in a wide variety of sophisticated financial instruments. See
STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPLICATIONS
OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS,

3 (2003) [hereinafter SEC

REPORT]

(describing

types of financial instruments in which hedge funds invest); REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE,
AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 2-3 (1999) [hereinafter
WORKING GROUP REPORT] (describing the various strategies and financial

instruments used by hedge funds); Kennard, supra note 196, at 158-59 (describing
offshore hedge funds).
Hedge fund interests are offered through private placements to wealthy
investors in order to minimize regulatory oversight by federal and state securities
agencies. See SEC REPORT, supra at 11-32. Although hedge fund interests are
"securities" for purposes of federal securities laws, hedge funds typically avoid
registration requirements through private placement exceptions. See id. at ix-x
(summarizing exclusions relied on by hedge funds to avoid registration). In a recent
report, SEC staff recommended that hedge fund advisers should be required to
register as investment advisers. Id. at xi. This recommendation was adopted in
December 2004. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund
Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004).
208See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 207, at 1 (stating that
the first
hedge fund "is conventionally dated to 1949" and that a 1968 survey "identified 140
funds"); Gary Weiss, Fall Guys? Mysterious and Vilified, Hedge Funds Are Also the
Street's Trailblazers,BUS. WK., April 25, 1994, at 116, 120 (explaining that hedge funds
"have been around for more than four decades").
209WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 207, at 1. When compared
with the
rest of the financial market, however, this was a relatively small sector. Id. at 1-2
(comparing hedge funds to other sectors). The SEC recently reported, "[i]t is
estimated that there are now approximately $870 billion of assets in approximately
7000 funds." Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,055 (Dec. 10, 2004).
210 Allison Bisbey Colter, Insurers Provide Access to Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 2, 2001, at B7F ("It wasn't until private placement policies were pitched to
wealthy individuals in the mid- to late- 1990s that anyone recognized the potential tax
benefits to hedge-fund investors.").
211 Id. (describing the development of this product); see also Schizer, supra note
9, at 1388-89 ("[I]nsurance is becoming an increasingly common method of securing
tax advantaged hedge fund returns."); Sheppard, supra note 11 (describing hedge
fund wrappers).
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November 2002, the Service used the investor control doctrine to
attack one method of wrapping hedge fund interests inside variable
insurance contracts.212
The taxpayer insurance company"' described in the ruling had
been offering contracts allowing the contract holder to allocate

premium to a number of hedge funds organized as private placement
The company argued that the look-through
partnerships.214
diversification rule for private placement partnerships was "evidence"
that the contract qualified "for favorable tax treatment ' ' 211 since "[tlhe
Two articles written in 1998, although not explicitly about wraparound annuities
holding hedge fund interests, suggest the availability of this technique. Bridget
O'Brian, Annuity Countertrend:Investors Can Choose Their Own Features,WALL ST.
J., Jan. 8, 1998, at R10 (describing "custom-made annuit[ies]"); Bridget O'Brian,
Offshore Annuities Give Benefit of Privacy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1998, at C18
(describing hedge fund managed, offshore annuities being used as tax shelters).
In addition, more general warnings about insurance wrappers were made in the
late 1990s. See Sheppard, supra note 52, at 735 ("Life insurers have figured out how
to wrap any conceivable financial product inside a tax-favored life insurance or
annuity contract ....); Stecker et al., supra note 6 (warning that products "flirt[ing]"
with investor control "could destroy the tax-deferral feature associated with these
products").
212I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May 2, 2002). The issuance of the private
letter ruling was known even before it was released to the public. See John D.
McKinnon, U.S. May CurtailHedge-Tax Haven Tied to Insurance, WALL ST.J., Sept.
12, 2002, at A10 (describing threatened "crackdown" by Treasury on hedge fund
insurance arrangements); Sheppard, supra note 12 (describing the ruling before it was
publicly released).
The issuance of a negative letter ruling is a fairly rare occurrence because the
taxpayer has the opportunity to withdraw the ruling request before a negative ruling
is issued. DODGE ET AL., supra note 113, at 100 (explaining that taxpayers may
withdraw requests to avoid issuance of an unfavorable ruling). The taxpayer in this
case did ask for reconsideration. See Jon Almeras, Treasury Official, Practitioners
Discuss Hedge Fund Letter Ruling, 97 TAx NOTES 1002, 1003 (Nov. 25, 2002)
(describing request for reconsideration by taxpayer's attorney). Since less aggressive
practitioners advised clients against relying on the look-through rule for private
placement partnerships to avoid investor control, one wonders why a private letter
ruling was sought in the first place. See Sheppard, supra note 12 (stating that "more
conservative law firms" would not issue legal opinions on hedge fund wrappers).
213The taxpayer was Keyport Life Insurance. Allison Bisbey Colter, Hedge
FundsEncounter Tax Hurdles, WALL ST.J., Dec. 18, 2002, at B7C.
214The contracts did specify that "[n]o Contract owner may be a general partner
or an investment manger of a PIP .... In addition, no Contract owner may
independently hold any interest in a PIP ..." I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May
2, 2002).
These requirements mitigated the possibility that the facts-andcircumstances test of investor control would apply.
Treasury ended this
215 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May 2, 2002).
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underlying assets of the segregated asset account are not available to
the general public because the [hedge fund interests] are limited to
purchase by only certain investors., 216 The insurance company
asserted that the investment available "inside" the insurance contract
and "outside" the contract were not "substantially identical": "[T]he

death benefit provisions (and mortality charges) create material
economic differences between the direct ownership of any asset and
the ownership of that asset through a variable life insurance
contract. 2 11 Similarly, the company contended that the enactment of
a definition of "life insurance contract" in 1984 precluded "the
application of the investor control theory to assets held by a life
insurance company under a life
insurance contract that satisfies the
',218
7702.
section
of
requirements
The Service rejected the contention that the look-through
diversification regulation allowed the taxpayer to circumvent investor
control."' The hedge fund interests were publicly available in the
colloquial sense if not in the SEC sense. In addition, the Service
noted that legislative history indicated congressional intent to "deny
annuity or life insurance treatment for investments that are publicly

argument by issuing proposed regulations that would repeal the regulation relied on
by these companies. Internal Revenue Service, supra note 113. In the preamble to
the recently proposed regulations, Treasury explained, "Congress intended to treat
qualified purchasers and accredited investors as part of the general public when
determining whether an investment is available for the purchase by the general
public." Id.
216I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May 2, 2002).
217 Id. The factual variations in Rev. Rul. 81-225 all described annuities. See
supra Part III.D.
21 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May 2, 2002); see
also AMERICAN BAR
ASS'N, supra note 192, at 137 (asserting that the investor control rulings were
"enforced through the.., diversification requirements"); Calabrese, supra note 206
(explaining that "some practitioners took the position that the previous investor
control rulings were mooted" by the diversification requirement); Frederic J.
Gelfond, 2003 Insurance Tax Year in Review: Part H - Product Tax Matters, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Feb. 26, 2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2004 TNT
38-60) (explaining argument made by some "that the diversification requirements
adopted by Congress in 1984 rendered the investor control doctrine obsolete");
Neufeld, supra note 114 (arguing that combination of statutory and regulatory law
allowed insurance accounts to invest in publicly available hedge funds); Stecker et al.,
supra note 6 (stating that it was "unclear whether Congress also intended the
diversification requirements to actually supersede those [investor control] rulings").
219The Service cited the preamble to the original temporary regulation. See
supra note 205 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 25 Va. Tax Rev. 177 2005-2006

178

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 25:129

available to investors., 20 The Service cited the various investor
control rulings described above"' and held:
[T]he interests in [the hedge funds] that support the
Contracts' sub-accounts are available for purchase... by
other members of the general public. Treating the Contract
holders as the owners of interests in [the hedge funds] ...is

consistent with Congress' intent to deny annuity or life
insurance treatment for investments that are publicly
available to investors.222
As occurred following the issuance of the mutual fund wrapper

revenue ruling, insurance-only funds were quickly discussed as one
way to avoid the letter ruling. For example, an article in the Wall
Street .Journalexplained that this private letter ruling meant that "[i]n
effect... hedge-fund advisers are no different from mutual-fund
companies, which have to set up separate 'clone' funds to sell through
insurance contracts,, 2 3 and which would make the ability to wrap

hedge funds more expensive.24
In the summer of 2003, the Service and Treasury formalized their
position by issuing a new investor control revenue ruling as well as

proposing amendments to the diversification regulations. 225 Revenue

220
221
2
221
224

This legislative history is quoted at note 190 supra and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.E.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May 2, 2002).
Colter, supra note 213, at B7C.
Id. ("Wrapping insurance contracts around hedge funds that also are available

to taxable investors is much cheaper, and the investment minimums tend to be
lower."); see also McCormick, supra note 204 (explaining that the "principal effect" of
any change to the look-through rule for non-registered partnerships "would be to
allow existing practices to continue in a slightly modified, if more expensive, form");
Lee A. Sheppard, Hedge Fund Wrapper Ruling Complicates Reaching Smaller
Investors, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 5, 2002) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2002 TNT 214-2) (stating that the letter ruling would mean the companies would
"have to persuade hedge fund managers to set up special funds for them").
225The proposed regulations were finalized on March 1, 2005. Internal
Revenue
Service, IRS Publishes Final Regs on Look-Through for Nonregistered Partnerships,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 1, 2005) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2005
TNT 39-10).
Several practitioners had urged Treasury to formalize its position. See, e.g.,
Richard W. Skillman, Attorney Urges Adoption of Regs on Investments Held Under
Variable Life Insurance Contracts, TAX NOTES TODAY (Jan. 9, 2003) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 6-35).
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Ruling 2003-92226 is strikingly similar to Revenue Ruling 81-225, 22 and

it describes three factual situations. In the first, a variable annuity
provided contract holders the right to allocate premiums among ten
partnerships, whose interests were sold only through private
placement offerings to qualifying investors. 22' The annuity contract
did provide that a contract holder could not "act as an investment
manager or independently own any interest in any [p]artnership
offered" under the annuity. 229 The second situation was identical to
the first except that it involved a life insurance contract instead of an
annuity. 23° The third situation repeated the first and second situations
except that the partnership interest could only be purchased through
an annuity or life insurance contract.23
Revenue Ruling 2003-92 held that only the final situation was
permissible, and thus is a reaffirmation• of Revenue
Ruling 81-225's
.232
prohibition on publicly available investments.
Revenue Ruling
2003-92 cites to and describes the primary investor control authorities
discussed in this article; however, the Ruling contains little actual
explanation for its outcome. It states only that in the first two
situations the accounts "hold interests in Partnerships for purchase
other than by purchasers of [annuity or life insurance contracts] from
insurance companies. Therefore, for federal income tax purposes,
Contract Holder is the owner of the interests in Partnerships ....
,,233

As to the third situation, because the accounts held interests in
partnerships that could only be purchased through an annuity or life
insurance contract, the partnerships were considered owned by the
insurance company rather than the contract holder.234
226This ruling was issued under section 61(a).

See David S. Neufeld, New
Guidance on Investor Control Rule: Road Map or Roadblock?, TAX NOTES TODAY
(Sept. 3, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 170-29) (positing
that the ruling could not be issued under section 817(d) given the existence of the
look-through regulation for nonregistered partnerships).
227 See supra Part III.D.
228Rev. Rul. 2003-92, 2003-33 I.R.B.
350.
229

Id.

230

Id.

231

Id.

233

Id.

232Id.

234Revenue Ruling 2003-92 was issued with a companion ruling, Revenue Ruling
2003-91. Rev. Rul. 2003-91, 2003-33 I.R.B. 347. This ruling contained a description of
another "good facts" situation involving investor control. In this ruling, multiple
subaccounts, up to twenty, were available to which contract holders could allocate
premiums. Id. Each subaccount had a different investment strategy, including
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Shortly after Revenue Ruling 2003-92 was released, Treasury also
issued proposed regulations removing the look-through diversification

provision for private placement partnerships. The preamble to the
regulations

described

the

look-through

rule for nonregistered

partnerships as "not consistent with Congressional intent because it is
not explicitly subject to the public availability limitation of section
817(h).,, 23 5
The preamble also described hedge fund wrapper
arrangements and explained:
Taxpayers that purchase a variable annuity or life insurance

contract are indirectly investing in partnership interests that
are available for direct investment by the general public. By

indirectly investing in these partnership interests through the
purchase of a variable contract taxpayers defer tax on

partnership earnings that might otherwise be currently
taxable. The Treasury Department and the IRS believe that

these arrangements (often marketed as "insurance
wrappers") are the type of overly investment oriented
insurance and annuity arrangements that Congress sought to
prevent when it enacted the diversification rules of section
817(h).236
These regulations were finalized on March 1, 2005.237 The final
regulations were little changed from the proposed regulations. 238
strategies as specific as "a South American stock fund, an energy fund and an Asian
markets fund." Id. The subaccount funds were accessible only through purchase of
an annuity or life insurance contract. Id. The ruling also emphasized the lack of an
agreement as to investment management between the contract holder and the
insurance company. Id.
Revenue Ruling 2003-91 is similar to Revenue Ruling 82-54. See supra notes
160-63 and accompanying text. Revenue Ruling 2003-91, however, amplifies
Revenue Ruling 82-54 by its allowance of up to twenty funds with investment
strategies significantly narrower than those in Revenue Ruling 82-54 (e.g., "Asian
markets fund" compared to a common stocks fund). Revenue Ruling 2003-91 does
not address whether twenty is the maximum number of funds permissible without
triggering investor control or otherwise discuss the significance of the number of
funds. For additional discussion of Revenue Ruling 2003-91, see Neufeld, supra note
226.
235 Internal Revenue Service, supra note
113.
236 Id.
237 Internal Revenue Service, supra note 225.
238 The other changes were technical corrections
meant to bring the examples
and definitions into conformance with the changes. For example, the definition for
"security" had to be revised also to include interests in a nonregistered partnership.
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Importantly, the final regulations did not change the requirements for
beneficial ownership in an underlying investment. Under a regulatory
exception to the requirement that all ownership be held by insurance

companies, managers may hold interests in the underlying investment
entity, but only if their return on the interest is calculated in the same
way as all the other interests in the entity.23 9 In response to the

proposed regulations' request for comments, several practitioners
urged that the requirement that a manager's interest be calculated the
same for both the manager and the segregated asset account creates a
situation in which it will be difficult to create insurance-only private
investment partnerships. 24° The inability to provide hedge fund
managers with better returns than those available to the insurance241
account investors may act as a tax avoidance deterrent.

The Treasury press releases issued in connection with the new

Id. The final regulations did allow taxpayers two additional calendar quarters in
which to meet the revised diversification requirements. The original date was the last
day of the second calendar quarter after the effective date of the regulations, which
was the finalization date. Internal Revenue Service, supra note 113. Thus, taxpayers
will have until December 31, 2005, to bring their products into conformance with the
amended diversification regulations. Internal Revenue Service, supra note 225.
239 See supra note 202.
240 See Calabrese, supra note 206 (pointing out private investment partnerships'
reliance on this exception); Davis & Harman LLP, Annuity Insurers Comment on
Investment Diversification Requirements, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 30, 2003) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 210-52) (arguing that the proposed
regulations "effectively preclude any potential for abuse of the General LookThrough Rule, without the need for the current rule requiring that the return on an
investment manager's interest be determined on an equal, pro rata basis with the
return on a segregated asset account's interest"); Dwight W. Ellis, III & Andrew W.
Needham, New Regs on Investor Control Rules: Concerns With the Road Map, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Sept. 23, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT
184-46) (noting that "[u]nder the new regime, therefore, a wrapped fund with an
incentive allocation cannot qualify for 'look through' treatment"); Laurie D. Lewis &
Lisa Tate, ACLI Suggests Modified Effective Date for Proposed Regs Targeting
Insurance as Tax-Avoidance Vehicle, TAX NOTES TODAY (Nov. 12, 2003) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 218-27) (arguing that "[n]on-pro-rata
distributions of the investment returns of segregated accounts should be permitted to
take account of certain bonus payments to investment managers commonly referred
to as incentive payments"); John E. Tavss & Daniel C. Murphy, Attorneys Suggest
Revised Look-Through Rule for Regs on Life Insurance, Annuity Contracts, TAX
NOTES TODAY (Nov. 13, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT
219-48) ("[U]nless the Identical Computation Requirement is eliminated from the
Regulations, it is likely that policyholders would be unable to access many private
investment partnerships.").
241 See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
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investor control revenue ruling and proposed regulations were on the

self-congratulatory side: 2 2 "[t]he regulation, together with Revenue
Ruling 2003-92 issued on July 23, 2003, will prevent taxpayers from
turning otherwise taxable investments in hedge funds and other
entities into tax-deferred or tax-free investments merely by
purchasing the investments through a life insurance or annuity
contract. ,243

A Wall Street Journal article cited one attorney's reaction to the
revenue ruling: "[m]any investors and their insurance brokers 'may
not be sleeping too well tonight.', 2
However, the article also
provided U.S.
Representative
Richard Neal's assessment:
"[u]nfortunately, I'm sure these clever promoters will be back next
24
week with another investment vehicle disguised as insurance. 1
242 See Treasury Department, Treasury Announces Efforts to Curb Abuse
of Life

Insurance, Annuity Contracts,TAX NOTES TODAY (July 24, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX
lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 142-23) (release for revenue rulings); Treasury
Department, Treasury, IRS Propose Reg to Limit Abuse of Life Insurance, Annuity
Contracts,TAX NOTES TODAY (July 30, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec.
cit., 2003 TNT 146-34) (release for proposed regulations). Treasury continued to tout
the issuance of these authorities well into 2004. See Treasury Department, Treasury
Commends Bush Administration Approach to Curbing Tax Shelters, TAX NOTES
TODAY (Feb. 20, 2004) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2004 TNT 34-19)
(describing administration action "to stop abusive transactions and eliminate
potential opportunities for abuse," including the issuance of Rev. Rul. 2003-92).
243 Treasury Department, Treasury, IRS Propose Reg to Limit Abuse
of Life
Insurance, Annuity Contracts, supra note 242. A writer for Tax Notes Today
described the Treasury release as "trumpet[ing] the rulings as tools 'to prevent
taxpayers from using insurance products and insurance companies as a means to
shelter income from current taxation."' Jon Almeras, IRS Issues Formal Guidance on
Investor Control for Variable Contracts, TAX NOTES TODAY (July 24, 2003) (LEXIS,
FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 142-4); see also David Lupi-Sher, IRS
Issues Regs to Limit Abuse of Life Insurance, Annuity Contracts,TAX NOTES TODAY
(July 30, 2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 146-2)
(describing news release on proposed regulations).
A practitioner comment, also published in Tax Notes Today, was particularly
strongly worded, stating that the release triggered "inaccurate reporting fostered by
Treasury .... No one asked if it really does what Treasury said it does or if there is
really any abuse at all. Sometimes it is not the weapons you have, but the weapons
the other side thinks you have that make all the difference." Neufeld, supra note 226.
For comments disagreeing with Neufeld, see Ellis & Needham, supra note 240
(stating that "[in the vast majority of cases, the proposed regulations.., will
invalidate insurance policies that wrap hedge fund investments").
24 Tom Herman & Theo Francis, Tax-Avoidance Device is Attacked, WALL
ST.

J., July 24, 2003, at D2.
241Id. As to the reaction when the regulation was proposed, see Treasury Seeks
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Indeed, there does appear to have been a collective shrug
•
246among
practitioners in this area when the 2003 ruling was issued.
The
reason was that insurance companies had already figured out their
247
next moves.

The same two techniques available following the investor control
rulings and legislation of the 1980s remain. Under the terms of the

2003 ruling, an insurance account is still permitted to invest in a hedge
fund, so long as all of the interests are owned by other insurance
accounts. In addition to creating insurance-only hedge funds, clones
of publicly available hedge funds can still be created without
technically running afoul of the new revenue rulings or proposed
regulation. 24s Finally, one writer has suggested that there would be no

prohibition
on a variable contract holding a derivative linked to a
e 249
hedge fund.
Perhaps a derivatives wrapper will be the next iteration
of the wraparound shelter to emerge.

to RestrictInsurance-Linked Tax Moves, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at C5.
246 See Almeras, supra note 243 (explaining that "because the rulings aren't
surprising, they won't change the marketplace").
247 The Treasury's announcement was not unexpected. As described supra
notes
212-24 and accompanying text, in 2002, the Service released a private letter ruling
applying the investor control rule to variable insurance hedge fund investments.
I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May 2, 2002); see Neufeld, supra note 226
(explaining that after the issuance of letter ruling 2002-44-001, "most reputable
insurance companies" changed practices in order to comply with the private ruling).
248 As briefly described, supra note 169, the use of
clones, or close clones, is
already common in the mutual fund area and has been for some time. See Ellen E.
Schultz, Fund Track: Variable Annuity 'Minimarts' Now Feature Big Brand Names,
WALL ST. J., July 31, 1996, at C1 (describing the availability of brand-name mutual
funds inside variable insurance products); Ellen E. Schultz, Your Money Matters:
Variable Annuities Provide the Choices of Mutual Funds, Plus Some Tax Breaks,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at C1 (same); cf David Franecki, Annuity Clones of
Mutual Funds Warned, WALL ST. J., May 26, 1998 at C22 (describing a case involving
improper labeling of funds underlying variable annuities); Vanessa O'Connell,
Annuity Funds and Namesakes May Differ, WALL ST. J., April 6, 1998, at B1 (warning
investors to be wary of the inaccurate use of brand-name mutual funds when buying
into variable insurance).
249 Michael A. Heimos, Attorney Critiques Regs Targeting
Use of Annuity
Contracts, Life Insurance As Tax Avoidance Vehicles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Oct. 30,
2003) (LEXIS, FEDTAX lib., TNT file, elec. cit., 2003 TNT 210-51) ("[N]othing
prevents the indexing of an insurance segregated asset account to a known hedge
fund, perhaps even by the same manager or managers of the hedge fund where such
are hired by an insurance company to manage an unorganized pool of assets."). The
success of this technique will depend in part on who is considered the issuer of the
derivative. See infra note 293.
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IV. THE EFFICACY OF THE AGENCIES' LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The contrast between the claims made by the tax agencies and
those made by the insurance industry regarding investor control and

diversification illustrates the contours of a troubling, but stable, truce
surrounding wraparound insurance contracts. Since 1981, members of
the insurance industry have claimed that a cloned fund is sufficient to
avoid both aspects of the investor control doctrine."O In doing so,

they implicitly assert that the agencies' restrictions impose relatively
minimal burdens on the wraparound technique."' To be sure,
insurance companies do complain about the burdens imposed by the
investor control doctrine and the diversification requirement, but their
reactions, particularly after the rulings issued on mutual fund
wrappers and hedge fund wrappers, have sounded more in scorn than

submission.
The tax agencies, on the other hand, have asserted that the

investor control doctrine and diversification requirement are strong
weapons in their war on tax shelters. Their press releases following

the issuance of proposed regulations and recent investor control
rulings, for example, were self-congratulatory

(even though the

agencies were fixing a problem largely of their own creation).252
Although this is the public position of the tax agencies, they are, of
course, aware that investor control and diversification fail to shut
250

Some private letter rulings have been issued suggesting the permissibility of

clone funds. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-03-014 (Oct. 11, 1983) (noting that account
fund had "the same general investment objectives and essentially the same investment
policies and procedures" of public mutual funds); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 94-22-006
through 94-22-012, 94-22-014 (Feb. 24, 1994) (all stating that there was no "public
access" to insurance account fund even though the fund would have the same
investment objective, investment advisor, principle underwriter and administrator as a
public fund); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-47-017 (Aug. 21, 1998) (describing in context of
a diversification ruling account fund that would have "the same as the investment
objectives and strategies" of a publicly available fund); Gordon 0. Pehrson et al., 546
T.M., Annuities, Life Insurance,and Long-Term Care InsuranceProductsA-51 (2003)
(asserting the argument that insurance-only clones should work to avoid investor
control).
The Service did, however, issue new letter rulings that deleted some of the
paragraphs that would have more clearly allowed clones. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9437-026 (June 17, 1994) (deleting paragraph about "public access" in rulings 94-22-006
through 94-22-012 and 94-22-014 and adding, "[n]o opinion was expressed as to the
ownership, for tax purposes, of the assets in each [segregated asset account]").
251 See Heimos, supra note 249 (explaining that "the status quo can
continue in
substance, though at an increased (but probably not prohibitive) cost").
252 See supra Part III.E.3.
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down completely the wraparound insurance tax shelter. For example,
one individual associated with the drafting of Revenue Ruling 81-225
explained that investor control was intended to increase the price of
the shelter in order to reduce revenue losses and move the technique
into fewer hands.253
As the insurance industry contends - and the tax agencies may
privately concede - the investor control doctrine and diversification
requirement leave room for insurance companies to craft substitute
wraparound insurance contracts for their wealthiest clients (although
recent changes in the diversification regulations introduced a
friction 214 that may dampen the technique for a time 21). Arguably, the
tax agencies could do more to burden wraparound insurance contracts
without overstepping statutory constraints. Increasing the burden on
wraparound contracts, however, would be a politically difficult move
given the strength of the insurance lobby and one that would be of
uncertain value. 2516 Indeed, it is unclear the extent to which the current
set of restrictions on wraparound contracts yield benefits. That is, the
revenue loss staunched by the application of investor control and the
diversification requirement may not be worth the costs incurred by
some to avoid these requirements, particularly when administrative
and taxpayer compliance costs are also taken into account. 257
While the political constraints faced by the tax agencies and the
uncertain benefits to be derived from additional action point to the
agencies' current lines as being sensible, investor control and the
diversification requirement are problematic because they may hinder
broader reform by masking the fundamental policy concerns raised by
variable insurance. Investor control and diversification allow the tax
agencies to "do something" when a particular iteration of the
253

Telephone Interview with Andrew D. Pike, Associate Dean and Professor of

Law, American University Washington College of Law (Apr. 19, 2005).
254 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 1315 (describing the trend in economics literature
that "us[es] the term 'frictions' to describe constraints on tax planning external to the
tax law"); Daniel Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50
TAX L. REV. 643, 658-59 (1995) (noting that "the use of such friction may be good or
bad, depending on the ratio between deterring undesirable tax-motivated transactions
on the one hand, and causing people to bear excess burden rather than pay tax on the
other").
25.5See infra notes 265-67 and accompanying
text.
256 See Schizer, supra note 7, 1354-57 (describing how "modest reforms"
may
enhance rather than diminish the "planning option").
257 See Weisbach, supra note 71 at 33 (asserting that traditional
efficiency
concerns in combination with administrative and compliance costs "are central to
analyzing shelters").
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wraparound insurance shelter grows large enough to draw attention to
itself, such as through media coverage. 21' But this agency activity will
not fool the sophisticated tax avoiders using wraparound shelters and
may cultivate public misperceptions about the utility of the tax benefit
granted inside buildup.
This Part first examines the revenue-related rationales for the
investor control doctrine and the diversification requirement,
including a discussion of the relative ease with which these restrictions
may be avoided. The discussion next turns to possible appearance
effects created by these restrictions. Finally, this Part considers the
effect of the restrictions on the prospect of broader reform.
A. Revenue Effects
The principal, revenue-related justification for the investor
control doctrine and diversification requirement is prevention of
conversion of ordinary income into tax-preferred income. 259 For
example, B, a wealthy individual, would like to invest in a hedge fund
interest that will produce $100,000 of ordinary income in a year. B is
subject to a 35% tax rate and would prefer to avoid or defer the
$35,000 tax that would be due on this income. By wrapping the hedge
fund interest in a variable annuity, B would realize the income
economically but would not be taxed on it until it was withdrawn. The
longer B can avoid withdrawing the inside buildup, the lower will be
260
If the contract were a life insurance wrapper
his effective tax rate.
rather than an annuity, B could hold the policy until death and his
261
beneficiary would receive the proceeds tax-free:
Fees - part of the price for the tax shelter - will cut into B's tax
benefit and hence the overall yield on the investment. B will have to
pay for both variable contract fees (including mortality expenses) and
any fees charged by the hedge fund. The sourcing rule of the investor
control doctrine adds to the expense of the wraparound contract,
See Schizer, supra note 9, at 1322-23 (describing political pressure to respond
to press reports of taxpayer abuse).
259 Similar "conversion transactions" were targeted by Congress through Code
section 1260, but this Code section does not apply to insurance contracts. See id. at
1385 (describing conversion transactions and how variable insurance may be used as a
substitute for derivatives).
260 If he waits to withdraw the money in retirement, he may also have the
advantage of being in a lower tax bracket at that time, otherwise, he could withdraw
the appreciation currently through the use of a tax-free loan.
261 See Schizer, supra note 6, at 1935 ("Even today, a zero rate is available with a
'life insurance wrapper'....").
258
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particularly as the switch is made from publicly available hedge funds
12
to insurance-only funds or clones.
Because of the imposition of the
investor control sourcing rule, B will have to locate an insurance
company (or group of insurance companies) willing to create its (or
their) own hedge fund or to clone someone else's hedge fund. The
costs arising from the need for insurance-only funds will likely be
passed on to the contract holders, and as the cost of the tax shelter
pushes down the overall investment yield, the shelter will become less
attractive.
Making the wraparound insurance contract less attractive is, of
course, the point behind the investor control doctrine. The costs
imposed by the sourcing rule may, however, prove transitory. They
are the costs of moving from a publicly available hedge fund to an
insurance-only hedge fund. Once the transition is complete, the costs
arising from the hedge fund component of the variable contract
should not differ significantly from those found in non-insurance
hedge funds. Imposition of the sourcing rule on hedge fund wrappers
may even have provided the insurance companies an incentive for
developing versions of the hedge fund wrapper that could be
promoted to less sophisticated investors. That is, an insurance
company faced with the necessity of creating insurance-only hedge
funds in order to stay in the hedge fund wrapper business may begin
marketing such funds as part of its mainstream offerings (assuming
relevant securities registration rules are complied with), heightening
the suitability concerns already present with all forms of variable
insurance. The past history of insurance wrappers supports this
possibility. The insurance-only requirement did not end the mutual
fund wrapper; arguably, it caused an expansion in the marketing of
such wrappers, albeit of insurance-only mutual funds.
Like the sourcing rule of the investor control doctrine, the
diversification rule is intended to limit income conversion by making
it more difficult to synthesize publicly available investments inside an
insurance contract. The presence of the look-through rule for
investment entities largely negates this intention. A publicly available
investment, such as a mutual fund or hedge fund, may be cloned and
diversification then easily satisfied through reliance on the lookthrough rule. Thus, the diversification rule does not directly affect the
ability to use hedge fund wrappers, although it raises the costs of all
variable contracts because insurance companies must monitor
262 See

Sheppard, supra note 224, at 734 (stating that "[u]nwinding these [hedge
fund wrappers] will not be cheap").
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compliance.16 ' The creation of hedge fund wrappers was not touched
off because the look-through rule suddenly made them attractive.
Rather, when Treasury allowed unregistered partnerships to qualify
automatically for the look-through rule, it created an opportunity for
taxpayers to argue that the regulation trumped investor control's
sourcing rule. This opportunity was valuable because it provided a
technical argument that allowed insurance companies to put off the
264
costs of creating insurance-only hedge funds.
The glitch in the look-through regulations also allowed taxpayers
the ability more easily to select their own hedge fund managers. The
exception for unregistered partnerships was originally put in place
apparently to allow real estate partnerships to compensate managers
261
Similarly,
through the return on the managers' partnership interest.
managers of hedge funds frequently are compensated through
ownership of a hedge fund interest offering a return different from
that of other interest holders. 266 The look-through exception for
unregistered partnerships allowed taxpayers to wrap hedge fund
interests managed by "superstars" in variable contracts without
having to find a way around the more rigorous limitations on manager
interests imposed on more typical investment entities underlying
variable insurance, such as mutual funds. Under the recently revised
regulations, managers may still hold interests in the hedge fund, but
their return must be computed the same as the other interests in the
fund. As one commentator on the recently revised regulations
explained, "unless the Identical Computation Requirement is
eliminated from the Regulations, it is likely that policyholders would
be unable to access many private investment partnerships., 267 Thus,
the hedge fund manager compensation system may do more to slow
expansion of customized, insurance-only hedge funds than the
diversification rule.
263The look-through

rule eases the difficulty in attaining diversification.
not,
however, rely on representations by the underlying
may
Insurance companies
entity. Regulations do provide relief for inadvertent failures - at the cost of a toll
charge. Treas. Reg. § 1.817-5(a)(2) (1989); see Stecker et al., supra note 6 (describing
process of obtaining a waiver for inadvertent diversification failures).
264 The argument also allowed these individuals to move easily from the
derivatives used prior to the enactment of section 1260 to variable insurance. See
Schizer, supra note 6, at 1935 (describing the use of wraparound insurance as hedge
fund derivatives); Schizer, supra note 9, at 1385.
265 See supra note 204.
266 See JOHNSTON, supra

note 7, at 57 (describing hedge fund managers as
charging "fat fees, sometimes taking a fifth of the investment profits for themselves").
267Tavss & Murphy, supra note 240.
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Curtailing conversion transactions is the primary revenue-related
rationale for the investor control and diversification rules.

These

rules, however, may also have effects at other points at which
derivatives and variable insurance might intersect. 268 For example, it is
plausible that the investor control and diversification rules may help
constrain access to annuity cash value. Although annuity withdrawals

and loans do not receive the same favorable tax treatment as life
insurance withdrawals and loans, variable annuity owners may be able

to cash in on economic appreciation inside a contract while
postponing the recognition of tax by constructing a hedge outside the
contract. 269 Similar techniques have been utilized in the case of stock
or options held by • executives
subject to restrictions preventing direct
.270
sale of the securities. The investor control doctrine's prohibition on
publicly available investments weakens a taxpayer's ability to
construct outside hedges on the variable annuity's underlying assets.
Nevertheless, if the underlying investment were the clone of a publicly
available investment, hedging would be possible. 271
In addition, any hedge of the underlying contract investments
would have to be designed to take diversification into account. The
derivatives market is sophisticated enough to be able to customize
around the diversification requirement if sufficient information about
26 Professor Schizer has also raised the possibility that
variable insurance

contracts may be used to circumvent the wash-sale rules. David M. Schizer,
Scrubbing the Wash Sale Rules, TAXES, Mar. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
11438288.
269 See Terrence R. Chorvat, Perceptionand Income:
The Behavioral Economics
of the Realization Doctrine,36 CONN. L. REV. 75, 84-85 (2003) (describing short sales
against the box); Schizer, supra note 9, at 1341-42 (describing derivatives, such as
short sales against the box and their substitutes, used for hedging during the 1980s and
1990s).
270 See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile
Legal Foundation
of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 458 n.60 (2000). Other rules and
frictions act as constraints. For example, in the case of executives' use of hedging,
they are often required to post collateral to enter the transaction, and generally that
collateral is best if it consists of the stock or options being hedged. Id. at 460. In the
case of variable annuities, using the annuity itself as collateral would trigger
withdrawal treatment in the amount of the loan. In addition, the fees involved in the
purchase of variable annuities are already quite steep. The addition of hedging
transaction costs may be sufficient to make this technique less appealing. Id. at 454
(stating that there are "significant transaction costs" to hedging for executives).
271 Although Congress has enacted legislation to attack the ability of taxpayers
to
use hedges to lock-in investment gains without triggering tax, this legislation does not
extend to hedges on appreciated variable annuity contracts. I.R.C. § 1259. For a
discussion of section 1259, see Schizer, supra note 9, at 1360-62.
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the underlying investments is available. 2 The look-through rule may
facilitate access to this information since diversification may be

satisfied by looking-through to the assets of mutual funds and
partnerships, which may be clones of publicly available mutual funds
or partnerships. The availability of derivatives for use in hedging
mutual fund or partnership interests (including hedge fund interests)
is well-established.27 3

The effect of the substance-over-form standard of the investor
control doctrine is less clear than that of the sourcing and
diversification rules. 274 Given the disregard aggressive taxpayers
showed for the public investment prohibition, it is possible such
taxpayers simply ignore the standard, except that they would try to
avoid the appearance of collusion and the exercise of outright control
over underlying contract assets.
For example, in the case of the
hedge fund wrappers, care might be taken not to hold interests in the
same hedge fund both inside and outside a variable insurance
contract.276
Although the investor control doctrine and the diversification
requirement may halt some conversion transactions and - more
speculatively - curtail tax-free access to annuity cash value, it is not
known whether the benefits are worth the cost of these anti-shelter
provisions. 277 Because investor control and diversification do not shut
272 See Frank Partnoy, Enron and the Derivatives World, in ENRON: CORPORATE
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 169, 170 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan

eds., 2004) ("Recent estimates of the size of the exchange-traded derivatives
market ... are in the range of $13 to $14 trillion in notional amount. By contrast, the
estimated notional amount of outstanding OTC derivatives as of year-end 2000 was
$95.2 trillion. And that estimate is most likely an understatement.").
173 See Schizer, supra note
6, at 1888.
274 There is considerable debate over the extent to which such substance-overform standards in general affect taxpayer behavior. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The
Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5 (2000); David Hariton, Sorting
Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235 (1998); Daniel Shaviro,
Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters & the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221
(July 10, 2000).
275 In tension with this standard is securities law's emphasis
on informationsharing.
276 The 2002 investor control private letter ruling contained a representation
to
that effect as did Revenue Ruling 2003-92. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-44-001 (May 2,
2002); Rev. Rul. 2003-92, 2003-2 C.B. 350.
277 See Shaviro, supra note 254, at 654 (describing the tax
system dealing with
financial assets as "almost a textbook description of a system that, with respect to
affected transactions, generates far less tax revenue than socially wasteful excess
burden."). It is difficult to measure whether efficiency has been achieved. See also
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down wraparound insurance completely, some taxpayers will incur
278
Costs must also be incurred by
costs to avoid these requirements.
taxpayers who wish to comply with these requirements, particularly
Finally, the requirements may
the diversification requirement.
increase the marketing of insurance-only hedge funds as a result of the
new certainty in this area. 279 Thus, as occurred following the issuance
of the mutual fund wrapper ruling, perhaps even more taxpayers will
invest in "good" insurance wrappers, thereby sheltering more revenue
through these products than would otherwise occur.
B. FairnessEffects
Governmental responses to tax shelters are often as much about
meeting fairness concerns as they are about revenue - providing
assurance that the system is not skewed in favor of the wealthy. This
has been the case with the agency responses to wraparound insurance.
First, the timing of the agency activity has been correlated with media
accounts about the use of wraparound insurance as a tax shelter,
suggesting that agency activity has been in part motivated by public
perception of wraparound insurance. In addition, the tax agencies
have issued press releases announcing their activities as belonging to
part of their anti-tax shelter stance. Finally, the substance of investor
control and diversification create fairness effects, but because of the
ease with which these requirements may be avoided, these effects may
be more illusory than real. Because the wraparound insurance shelter
grows from a statutory tax subsidy, however, the periodic weeding-out
efforts by the agencies have, out of necessity, left the root of the
shelter untouched.
The history of wraparound insurance products reveals a
and
correlation between
28O the appearance of mainstream media reports
With respect to the investment annuity in
agency response.
particular, the agencies seem genuinely not to have understood the tax
shelter implications of the product until active marketing by insurance

Schizer, supra note 7, at 1357-58 (noting that "it is hard to generalize about
efficiency" and arguing for the importance of obtaining "empirical judgments");
Shaviro, supra note 254, at 684 (describing the difficulties of evaluating tax changes
"without better empirical information about revenue effects and transactions costs").
278 Weisbach, supra note 71, at 32-33 (describing how in the face of changes to
tax shelter rules, "some individuals will choose to continue sheltering... [because]
the additional cost will be worth the tax savings").
279 See Gergen & Schmitz, supra note 4.
See supra Parts III.B-D & F.
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companies triggered mainstream media coverage.
In the case of the
savers' annuity and mutual fund wrapper, however, media coverage
may have served more to measure the degree of sheltering than as a
source of new revelations. That is, the tax agencies may have relied
(perhaps even unconsciously) on mainstream media coverage as an
indicator that the shelter had once again become actively marketed
and more widely accessible and, therefore, that further agency action
was required.
The earlier wraparound products grew while the agencies were at
the beginning stages of developing an understanding of new insurance
products, including not just variable insurance but also universal life
insurance.
This period culminated
in strong Treasury
recommendations to Congress to end the deferral for inside buildup
as part of reform efforts during the mid-1980s. Congress did not end
the subsidy, and although various subsequent administrations have
supported proposals to curtail the benefit, the current prospect of
fundamental reform in this area is low. In the time period since
Congress last took a serious look at inside buildup, the increasing
sophistication of derivative products and the development of the
hedge fund industry have made this subsidy more problematic.
The most recent agency effort to control wraparound insurance
occurred against this backdrop - a long agency history of dealing
with wraparound insurance revealing the shortcomings of investor
control and diversification, low prospects for broader reform, and the
emergence of more sophisticated means of using the old wraparound
shelter. As media coverage increased about the coupling of hedge
funds and insurance companies, pressure to respond also grew.
Further, insurance companies marketing hedge fund wrappers could
point to a Treasury regulation as technical support for their position.
Yet even after revocation of this regulation, the technique could
continue through the use of clones or through derivatives wrappers,
which may be the next type of wraparound insurance shelter to
emerge. In this context, the agency action taken against hedge fund
wrappers, while arguably as helpful as earlier action, seems primarily
aimed at allaying, in the short term, concerns about fairness. Of
course, preserving system fairness is an important tax agency role, but
some tax agency efforts in this regard seem more cynical than others.
Investor control and diversification ensure that the investment
inside a variable contract does not - superficially at least - look the
same as one existing outside a contract. The inability to hold an

2.8

See supra Part III.B.
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identical investment both inside and outside an insurance contract
helps cultivate the impression that there is something differentiating
the investments underlying variable insurance from other investments

that makes them deserving of congressional largesse - that horizontal
equity is not violated by these products. 282 By the time of the hedge

fund wrapper rulings, the agencies' experience with derivatives must,
however, have made it clear that such differentiation is not possible.

Yet, there is no hint of the limitations facing the tax agencies apparent
in their press releases surrounding these rulings.
Investor control and diversification also hold out the promise that
wealthy individuals will not be able to customize, 28' but these

requirements at most make customization more expensive.

284

Changes

to the diversification regulations have also made it more difficult for
owners to compensate hedge fund managers, but new ways of
compensating these managers may be developed, and the increased

expense may only be temporary as insurance companies turn to
insurance-only hedge fund clones or possibly to derivatives wrappers
as substitutes for the hedge fund wrapper.
Investor control and diversification may also cause confusion
about the suitability of variable insurance for less wealthy taxpayers.
The provision of adequate counseling on suitability by brokers selling
variable insurance has been a perennial concern. 28'
The
It has been suggested that Congress already has decided - through the
legislation enacted in the 1980s - that it is only concerned about appearance.
Richard Skillman, a tax practitioner who as served as Deputy Chief Counsel and as
Acting Chief Counsel at the Service, has argued: "[W]hile the legislative history of
section 817(h) indicates that Congress viewed it as generally inappropriate for
taxpayers to use variable contracts to obtain interests in 'publicly available'
investments, the congressional policy concerns may have been rooted in appearance
more than economic substance .... Skillman, supra note 225.
283 Distributional effects are associated with vertical
equity. See SLEMROD &
BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 58 ("[W]e deal with the divisive issue of vertical equity or, in
other words, the appropriate degree of tax progressivity."); Weisbach, supra note 14,
at 1647 ("An alternative formulation of vertical equity is simply a concern with the
distributional impact of taxes.").
284 The ability to place private placement hedge funds inside
customized
insurance wrappers may have provided the holders of such contracts with personal
satisfaction derived from ownership of prestige symbols. Just as retail versions of the
mutual-fund wrapper have become commonplace, retail hedge fund wrappers may
become more "common" as a result of recent investor control activity. This might
render hedge fund wrappers less attractive, to the extent they were selected as status
symbols, or it may simply cause the wealthiest individuals to find a new, elite
wraparound technique.
285 See, e.g., Dismissal of Variable Annuity Class Action Was Proper,
91 TAX
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representation by the tax agencies that variable insurance is now
fairer because of the removal of hedge fund wrappers may foster the
illusion that taxpayers derive equal benefit from the tax deferral
granted to the variable insurance inside buildup. Since the general
lack of understanding about the beneficiaries of the tax subsidy for
286
inside buildup is already high, the impact of investor control rulings
and revised diversification regulations may be small. The possible
availability of mainstream, insurance-only hedge fund wrappers may,
however, exacerbate suitability concerns, and the rulings certainly do
not help promote understanding about the general fairness of the tax
treatment for insurance products.
C. Prospectsfor Reform
Press coverage of the wraparound insurance tax shelter has
receded since the issuance of the new rulings and revised regulations.
The most recent agency activity with respect to wraparound insurance
may have brought about a temporary lull in the shelter, or it may be
that new iterations are being devised and marketed to such a small
group of individuals that it has not yet received attention."' The
shelter seems, however, almost certain to reappear given the relative
ease with which investor control and diversification may be
circumvented.
The tax agencies could lessen the attractiveness of using
wraparound insurance in conversion transactions by further increasing
the burden imposed on these transactions. The Code provides the
agencies significant authority to deal with the issue of wraparound
insurance. 288 The agencies might, for example, develop rules about the
allowable number of underlying investments and of changes between
NOTES 1875, 1875-76 (June 11, 2001) (describing dismissal of class action alleging

unfair practices in company advising on appropriateness of variable contracts).
286 See supra
Part II.C.
2S7 Other factors also play an important role
in the attractiveness of

this tax
shelter. For example, low tax rates generally make sheltering less popular. The fee
structure and mortality charges for variable insurance may also help keep this
particular shelter in check because there may be cheaper substitute shelters. The
inability to deduct losses sustained inside a variable contract may also play a role in
constraining some wraparound insurance schemes. Schizer, supra note 6, at 1936 ("A
provocative implication.. . is that [hedge fund wrappers] do not require special
attention .... Whereas gains are not taxed, losses are not deductible.").
288 But see Alexander, supra note 88 (asserting, "[p]ut simply,
we believe current
law imposes significant restrictions on the ability of the Service to further limit the
availability of deferred variable annuity contracts.").
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underlying investments during the year. 289 The agencies could
prohibit segregated asset accounts from directly investing in clones of
publicly available investments, and they may also be able to prohibit

underlying investments
similar to publicly
• .
. 290 that are substantially
available investments.
The agencies could also eliminate lookthrough altogether for partnerships since the Code
291 mandates looktrusts.
and
funds
mutual
for
only
treatment
through

292
No single one of these options is certain to end the technique,

and they would be of uncertain benefit because of increased costs,

whether incurred by taxpayers in complying with (or avoiding) the
new rules or by the agencies in monitoring for complex synthetic
arrangements. If the agencies were to prohibit allocations to clones of
publicly available investments, for example, taxpayers could blend
two clones in known percentages - that is, hedge fund A as 40% of
the combined fund and hedge fund B as 60%. Additionally, if the
agencies prohibited look-through for partnerships, a fund might be
created to hold derivatives of publicly available hedge funds.293
Hesitancy over further burdening wraparound insurance may also

289

See Thompson, supra note 20, at 520 (explaining that "the Internal Revenue

Service has issued warnings that too much investment choice in a deferred variable
annuity might result in unfavorable tax treatment, but it never issued regulations
quantifying its precise position .... "). But see Alexander, supra note 88.
290 As described supra Part III.E.3, legislative history for section 817 warns
against this. Professor Schizer has argued that Treasury has authority under section
1260 to reach this result. See Schizer, supra note 9, at 1389. However, as he
acknowledges, section 1260 specifically applies only when ordinary income is
converted to "long term capital gain." Id. at 1389 & n.289. In the case of annuities
and life insurance, ordinary income is being converted to inside buildup, which
receives tax deferral. It is taxed at ordinary income rates when it is withdrawn.
291 In addition to these substantive measures, the agencies could
have also
applied retroactivity more stringently to their investor control rulings.
292 Cf. Schizer, supra note 9, at 1385 (asserting that "Treasury
arguably has the
necessary regulatory authority under current law" to end conversion transactions that
make use of variable insurance contracts).
293 It would have to meet the diversification test, so at least
five investments
representing five different issuers would be required. It is unclear who the issuer
would be in the case of derivatives. The Service has held in a private letter ruling that
the issuer of a repurchase agreement was the broker rather than the issuer of the
underlying securities. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-25-038 (Mar. 27, 1991); cf. I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,708 (Mar. 14, 1988) (concluding that the issuer of stock index options
or futures for purposes of the RIC diversification rules "are issuers of the stocks
underlying the index"). If, however, the issuer of a derivative were considered to be
the same as that of a publicly available investment, then the investor control doctrine
should still operate to prohibit such a structure.
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be warranted by the fact that were the tax agencies to impose
additional restrictions on the insurance industry, the industry would
likely respond as it has in the past to encroachment - with an
294
aggressive lobbying campaign.
Such a lobbying campaign could
even result in the creation of further unjustifiable benefits for
insurance rather than congressional involvement leading to broader
reform. Investor control and diversification may thus be viewed as
the terms of an uneasy pact between the insurance industry and the
agencies under which the insurance industry is subjected to the
relatively minimal burdens imposed by these requirements, and the
agencies are able to continue asserting some control over the
wraparound insurance technique.
While the agencies' decision not to disrupt this stability is
sensible, their actions may also reduce the possibility that
fundamental reform in this area will take place. As described in the
preceding section, the ability of the tax agencies to respond to media
coverage with investor control and diversification may cause casual
observers to believe that more has been accomplished than actually
has been. The agencies could mitigate this possibility by providing
more information about the limitations on reaching wraparound
insurance and about the tax benefits of all cash value insurance in
To be sure, the limitations of investor control and
general.
diversification are already discussed in the mainstream financial press,
though primarily by the insurance industry and its representatives. In
addition, non-tax regulators, such as the SEC and the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), have expressed concern
about whether insurance brokers adequately discuss suitability,
including tax consequences, with potential contract holders of variable
contracts. A clear message from the tax agencies about the limitations
of investor control and diversification could help the public make
better sense of both the comments from the insurance industry and
the concerns of non-tax regulators.
The "arcaneness '' 29 5 of variable insurance taxation would,
however, affect the extent to which the agencies could successfully
inform the taxpayer about the interplay of agency action and statutory
constraint. It is easier to impart the message that the tax agencies
have "done something" to make insurance products fairer than to

294

See supra notes 58, 293 and accompanying text.
See

supra note 15, at 87 (describing how tax politics are hindered
"in the informational realm. An initial problem is simply the arcaneness of
determining what would be, say, neutral treatment of competing instruments.").
295

SHAVIRO,
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explain the limitations on the reach of that activity.' 96 Further, the
297

agencies may be averse to exposing their limitations to the public.

There is, for example, some evidence that lack of confidence in the

fairness of the tax system may trigger noncompliance, and that
taxpayers may increase compliance if they perceive that the system is
298

operating fairly.

A more feasible approach to obtaining support for broad reform
may be to appeal to Congress directly.299 During the early 1980s,

Treasury urged comprehensive reforms in the area of insurance,
including the full taxation of inside buildup on cash value life
insurance. 3°° Although this particular reform was not enacted, some

legislative restrictions on cash value insurance products were
Cf. Schizer, supra note 9, at 1321 ("For sophisticated transactions, average
taxpayers could well be fooled in this way for some period of time, but eventually
they are likely to learn the truth, for instance, through media coverage of
avoidance.").
In the estate tax area, there is widespread support for repeal although it affects
only a limited number of individuals. This disparity may be caused by a combination
of rational ignorance and optimism bias. See Lee Ann Fennell, Death, Taxes and
Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567 (2003); see also JOHNSTON, supra note 7, at 71-91
(describing misperceptions about the application of the estate tax and ascribing them
in part to deliberate campaigns to misinform).
297 See Michael S. Kirsch, Alternative Sanctions and the Federal
Tax Law:
Symbols, Shaming, and Social Norm Management as a Substitute for Effective Tax
Policy, 89 IOWA L. REV. 863 (2004); Schizer, supra note 9, at 1321 (describing
symbolic benefits that may emerge from "even relatively ineffective efforts to curtail
planning"); see also Shaviro, supra note 254, at 700 (discussing how certain
transactions may "as an aesthetic matter.., excite hostility from defenders of the tax
system - notwithstanding that one may accomplish but little.., if taxpayers, with
sufficient ease, can achieve a favorable result by structuring slightly differently").
298 See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between
Norms and Enforcement in
Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1484-99 (discussing evidence suggesting that
publicity about certain types of tax avoidance or tax enforcement may affect taxpayer
compliance); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN.
L. REV. 1065, 1078 (2003) (discussing survey evidence showing "that deterrence
messages communicated through mass media are related to increased perceptions of
detection and punishment for tax evasion"); John T. Scholz, Comment on Carrotsand
Sticks in Enforcement, in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 258, 261-62 (Henry J.
Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004) (discussing plausibility of a model in which
"taxpayers obey the terms of an implicit tax contract as long as other taxpayers and
the government meet their expected roles").
299 This assumes that the current administration is amenable to Treasury
taking
such a role.
300 See BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 56, at 57, 84-85 (describing
Treasury
proposals to tax inside buildup).
216
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301

implemented.
It is likely not politically possible to obtain full repeal
of the tax deferral for inside buildup on all cash value life insurance
and annuities. 302 It may, however, be more viable to obtain reforms
aimed only at variable insurance.3 °3
For example, variable contract holders could be taxed as though
they had purchased the underlying investment and a fixed, cash value
life insurance contract or annuity earning the risk-free rate of return.
Deferral of tax could continue on that portion representing the riskfree rate.3°
Bifurcation approaches such as this would raise
complexity concerns; however, insurance companies likely already
have the necessary administrative mechanisms in place since the funds
underlying variable contracts are essentially treated as separate tax
entities whose tax items flow to the insurance companies rather than
to the contract holders. An even less drastic alternative would be to
impose annual contribution limits on variable contracts such as those
in place for other types of tax-preferred retirement products (e.g.,
401(k) plans).30 5
In conjunction with direct appeals to Congress, the agencies could
use deliberate inaction to focus legislative attention on the problem of
variable insurance taxation. This is not to suggest that the agencies
should abdicate their responsibilities to "apply[] the tax law with
integrity and fairness to all. ' '306 To the contrary, it would require that
they signal the need for broader reform and time such signals to
follow media coverage about the newest wraparound shelter iteration.
Press attention on wraparound insurance could be met by the tax
agencies not with new investor control rulings but with statements
about the necessity of congressional intervention in this area. Media
pressure has been effective in the past at motivating Congress. 30,
See supra Part III.E.
302See Thompson, supra note 20, at 525-26 (discussing likelihood
that Congress
would take specific action to constrain variable annuities).
303 Id. at 508-26 (suggesting a course of possible
congressional action).
3W Cf. Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 6, at 735 (urging
that all investment
assets be subject to tax on at least the risk-free rate of return).
305But see Thompson, supra note 20, at 517-18 (arguing that the
"recurring
proposal" of placing limits on allowable contributions is "probably not sound
policy").
306The IRS Mission, 1998-44 I.R.B.
2.
307See Schizer, supra note 9, at 1343 & n.101 (describing how Code
section 1259,
which applies a constructive sale rule to certain hedging transactions, was enacted in
response to a highly publicized case involving the Estee Lauder family); Daniel
Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process
as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24-27 (1990)
301
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With respect to hedge fund wrappers, for example, it may have
been more effective for the tax agencies to have taken a more
minimalist approach. At the time the hedge fund investor control
ruling was issued, there were not only press reports about wraparound
insurance products but also reports about other avoidance techniques
involving hedge funds and insurance 3 8 Securities law issues involving
variable insurance and hedge fund were also increasingly being raised
in the financial press. Strategic inaction on the part of the tax
agencies - in combination with the atmosphere of concern about
variable insurance and hedge funds - may have prompted Congress
to intervene. Instead, the tax agencies deflected the attention of the
financial press from Congress to themselves through their rulemaking
actions.
V.

CONCLUSION

The history of wraparound insurance reveals a cat-and-mouse
game typical of tax shelters. Just as in the cartoons of this genre, the
cat appears doomed always to be one step behind. Congressional
action removing the differential treatment for variable insurance
inside buildup is required to end this particular chase. This article
suggests that a course of minimalist response to new iterations of the
wraparound insurance shelter, combined with proposals for broadbased reform, may be the best avenue for the tax agencies to bring
about such legislative change.

(describing influence of media on reform in the 1980s).
308 See JOHNSTON, supra note 7, at 57-58 (discussing tax avoidance
techniques
involving hedge funds and insurance).
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